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The last fifteen years have been marked by a dramatic boom-bust cycle in real estate prices, accompanied
by economically large fluctuations in international capital flows. We argue that changes in international
capital flows played, at most, a small role in driving house price movements in this episode and that,
instead, the key causal factor was a financial market liberalization and its subsequent reversal. Using
observations on credit standards, capital flows, and interest rates, we find that a bank survey measure
of credit supply, by itself, explains 53 percent of the quarterly variation in house price growth in the
U.S. over the period 1992-2010, while it explains 66 percent over the period since 2000. By contrast,
once we control for credit supply, various measures of capital flows, real interest rates, and aggregate
activity—collectively—add less than 5% to the fraction of variation explained for these same movements
in home values. Credit supply retains its strong marginal explanatory power for house price movements
over the period 2002-2010 in a panel of international data, while capital flows have no explanatory
power.
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The last ￿fteen years have been marked by a dramatic boom-bust cycle in real estate prices, a
pattern unprecedented both in amplitude and in scope that a⁄ected many countries around the
globe and most regions within the United States (Figure 1). Over the same period, there were
economically large ￿ uctuations in international capital ￿ ows. Countries that exhibited the largest
house price increases also often exhibited large and increasing net in￿ ows of foreign capital that
bankrolled sharply higher trade de￿cits. Economists have debated the role of international capital
￿ ows in explaining these movements in house prices and asset market volatility more generally. A
common hypothesis is that house price increases are positively related to a rise in the country￿ s
net foreign in￿ ows, either because they directly cause house price increases (perhaps by lowering
real interest rates), or because other factors simultaneously drive up both house prices and capital
in￿ ows. In this article, we study both theory and evidence that bears on this hypothesis, focusing
on the unprecedented boom-bust cycle in housing markets that took place over the last 15 years.
We argue that changes in international capital ￿ ows played, at most, a small role driving house
price movements in this episode and that, instead, the key causal factor was a ￿nancial market
liberalization and its subsequent reversal that took place in many countries largely independently
of international capital ￿ ows. Financial market liberalization (FML hereafter) refers to a set of
regulatory and market changes and subsequent decisions by ￿nancial intermediaries that made it
easier and less costly for households to obtain mortgages, borrow against home equity, and adjust
their consumption.
By contrast, we argue that net capital ￿ ows into the United States over both the boom and
the bust period in housing have followed a largely independent path, driven to great extent by
foreign governments￿regulatory, reserve currency, and economic policy motives. Consider the
value of foreign holdings of U.S. assets minus U.S. holdings of foreign assets, referred to hereafter
as net foreign asset holdings in the U.S., or alternatively, as the U.S. net liability position. A
positive change in net foreign asset holdings indicates a capital in￿ ow, or more borrowing from
abroad.1 As we show below, from 1994 to 2010, only the change in net foreign holdings of U.S.
securities (equities, corporate, U.S. Agency and Treasury bills and bonds) show any discernible
upward trend. Moreover, among securities, the upward trend has been driven almost entirely by
an increase in net foreign holdings of U.S. assets considered to be safe stores-of-value, speci￿cally
U.S. Treasury and Agency debt. Yet in￿ ows into these securities, rather than declining during the
housing bust, have on average continued to increase. Importantly, foreign demand for U.S. ￿safe￿
1What we have de￿ned as net foreign asset holdings, or the U.S. net liability position, is equal to the negative of
the U.S. net international investment position in the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis balance of payments system.
A country￿ s resource constraint limits its expenditures on (government and private) consumption and investment
goods, fees, and services, to its domestic output plus the change in the market value of its net liabilities (minus the
change in the net international investment position). Thus a country￿ s ability to spend in excess of domestic income
in a given period depends positively on the change in its net foreign liabilities.
2assets is dominated by Foreign O¢ cial Institutions, namely government entities that have speci￿c
regulatory and reserve currency motives for holding U.S. Treasuries and other U.S.￿ backed assets,
and that face both legal and political restrictions on the type of assets that can be held (Kohn
(2002)). Such entities take extremely inelastic positions, implying that when these holders receive
funds to invest, they buy U.S. Treasuries regardless of price (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen
(2010)).










Figure 1: Price-Rent Ratio in the United States. The ￿gure plots an aggregate price-rent ratio index for the
United states from 1975:Q4-2010:Q4. Rent is rent for primary residence, constructed from the Shelter component
of the Consumer Price Index for all urban consumers, SA, last month of each quarter. Data available from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Department of Commerce. Price is the Core Logic National House Price
Index (SA, Jan.2000=100). The price-rent ratio has been normalized to equal the level, in 1975:Q4 of the quarterly
Price-Rent ratio constructed from the ￿ ow of funds housing wealth and National Income and Products data on
housing consumption.
We interpret these recent events through the lens of the theoretical models in Favilukis, Lud-
vigson, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2009), henceforth FLVNa, and Favilukis, Ludvigson, and Van
Nieuwerburgh (2011), henceforth FLVNb. These papers study the economic consequences of both
the U.S. FML (and its reversal) and, at the same time, empirically calibrated ￿ uctuations in net
capital in￿ ows into the U.S. riskless bond market. The model environment is a two-sector general
equilibrium framework with housing and non-housing production where heterogeneous households
face uninsurable idiosyncratic and aggregate risks. Given the assets available in the model econ-
omy and collateralized ￿nancing restrictions, individuals can only imperfectly insure against both
types of risk. We argue that these frameworks can account for the observed boom-bust pattern
in house prices simultaneously with the continuing trend towards greater net capital in￿ ows into
3U.S. securities over both the boom and the bust.2 Fluctuations in the model￿ s price-rent ratio are
driven by changing risk premia, which vary endogenously in response to cyclical shocks, the FML
and its subsequent reversal, and capital in￿ ows. In FLVNa, house prices rise in the boom period
because of a relaxation of credit constraints and decline in housing-related transactions costs, both
of which reduce risk premia. Conversely, the reversal of the FML raises housing risk premia and
causes the housing bust.
In contrast to the FML, an in￿ ow of foreign money into domestic bond markets plays a small role
in driving home prices in the models of FLVNa and FLVNb, despite its large depressing in￿ uence
on interest rates. The reason is that a capital in￿ ow into the safe bond market￿ by itself￿ raises risk
premia on housing and equity, as domestic savers are forced out of the safe bond market and into
risky securities. (We emphasize the words ￿ by itself￿here because this increase in risk premia is
more than o⁄set by the simultaneous decline in risk premia during the boom caused by the FML.)
At the same time, the capital in￿ ow stimulates residential investment and an expected increase in
the housing stock. So while low interest rates in isolation tend to raise home prices, these general
equilibrium consequences tend to reduce them, thereby limiting the scope for a capital in￿ ow to
increase home prices. It follows that the sharp rise in price-rent ratios during the boom period
must be attributed to an overall decline in risk premia and not to a fall in interest rates. Many
alternative theories that can account for the positive correlation between house prices and capital
in￿ ows in the boom period are not able to explain the bust period, in which house prices collapsed
but in￿ ows into countries like the U.S. continued.
By FML we mean an outward shift in the availability of credit, at any given initial level of credit
demand and borrower quality. This includes, as in the U.S. housing boom, an increase in maximal
loan-to-value (LTV) ratios (e.g., the fraction of loans with combined￿ ￿rst and second￿ mortgage
LTV ratios above 80% or 90%), an increase in the availability of new mortgage contracts (option-
ARMs, interest only and negative amortization loans, loans to households with low FICO scores), a
reduction in documentation requirements (asset and income veri￿cation), a rapid increase in the use
of private-label securitization, and a reduction in fees (as well as in time and e⁄ort) associated with
re￿nancing a mortgage or obtaining a home equity line of credit. The widespread relaxation of credit
standards is well documented (see discussion below). Consistent with this evidence, microeconomic
evidence in Mian and Su￿(2009) show that mortgage credit expansion and house price growth in the
boom were concentrated in areas with a large fraction of subprime mortgages and securitization of
these mortgages, and not in areas with improved/ing economic prospects. Thus, this component of
credit availability to households￿ accompanied by government deregulation of ￿nancial institutions
and widespread changes in the way housing assets were ￿nanced and traded￿ appears to have
2There was considerable volatility in the changes of net foreign asset holdings in the U.S. during the ￿nancial
crisis in 2008 and 2009. Nevertheless, we show below that the changes in holdings were still higher at the end of the
sample in 2010 than they were at the peak of the housing boom in 2006.
4￿ uctuated, to great extent, independently of current and future economic conditions.
But credit availability can also change endogenously in response to ￿ uctuations in the aggregate
economy and to revisions in expectations about future economic conditions, including house price
growth. This information is re￿ ected immediately in collateral values that constrain borrowing
capacity. As in classic ￿nancial accelerator models (e.g., Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997)), endogenous shifts in borrowing capacity imply that economic shocks have a
much larger e⁄ect on asset prices than they would in frictionless environments without collater-
alized ￿nancing restrictions. Both exogenous and endogenous components of time-varying credit
availability to households are operative in the model of FLVNa.
While endogenous ￿ uctuations in credit availability are clearly important in theory, it is unclear
how quantitatively important they have been empirically, especially in the recent housing boom-
bust episode. Some researchers have argued that credit availability is primarily driven by the
political economy, and in particular by political constituencies that in￿ uence bank regulation related
to credit availability (e.g., Mian, Su￿, and Trebbi (2009); Rice and Strahan (2010); Boz and
Mendoza (2011); Rajan and Ramcharan (2011b)). Such a component to credit availability could
in fact be independent of economic fundamentals, expectations of future fundamentals, and credit
demand.
Using observations on credit standards, capital ￿ ows, and interest rates for the U.S. and for a
panel of 11 countries, we present evidence on how these variables are related to real house price
movements in recent data. Our main measure of credit standards is compiled from quarterly bank
surveys of senior loan o¢ cers, carried out by national central banks as part of their regulatory
oversight. We consider this a summary indicator of ￿ uctuations in the variables associated with a
FML, as described above. The surveys speci￿cally address changes in a bank￿ s supply of credit, as
distinct from changes in its perceived demand for credit. We ￿nd for the U.S. that this measure of
credit supply, by itself, explains 53 percent of the quarterly variation in house price growth over the
period 1992-2010, while it explains 66 percent over the period since 2000. By contrast, controlling
for credit supply, various measures of capital ￿ ows, real interest rates, and aggregate activity￿
collectively￿ add less than 5% to the fraction of variation explained for these same movements
in home values. Credit supply retains its strong marginal explanatory power for house price
movements over the period 2002-2010 in a panel of international data, while capital ￿ ows have
no explanatory power. Moreover, credit standards continues to be the most important variable
related to future home price ￿ uctuations even when it has been rendered statistically orthogonal
to banks￿perceptions of credit demand, and even when controlling for expected future economic
growth and expected future real interest rates. Taken together, these ￿ndings suggest that a stark
shift in bank lending practices￿ conspicuous in the FML and its reversal￿ were at the root of the
housing crisis.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses theoretical literature
5that has addressed the link between house prices, capital ￿ ows and/or credit supply. To provide
a theoretical frame of reference, here we also describe in detail the predictions of FLVNa for
house price movements. Section 3 turns to the data, presenting stylized facts on international
capital ￿ ows, interest rates and credit standards. Section 4 presents an empirical analysis of
the linkage between capital ￿ ows and house price ￿ uctuations, controlling for measures of credit
supply, economic activity, and real interest rates. Section 5 concludes. Section 6 is an Appendix
that provides details on the data we use and on our estimation methodology.
2 Theories
A number of studies have addressed the link between house prices and capital ￿ ows, focusing on
the recent boom period in housing. For brevity, we will refer to the period of rapid home price
appreciation from 2000 to 2006 as the boom period in the U.S., and the period 2007 to present as
the bust.
The global savings glut hypothesis (Bernanke (2005), Mendoza, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (2007),
Bernanke (2008), Caballero, Fahri, and Gourinchas (2008), Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2009))
contends that the excess savings of developing countries, notably China and emerging Asia, sought
safe, high-quality ￿nancial assets that their own economies could not provide. Because of the depth,
breadth, and safety of U.S. Treasury and Agency markets, those savings predominantly found their
way to the United States. Some have directly linked these patterns to higher U.S. home prices,
arguing that low interest rates (driven in part by the capital in￿ ow) were a key determinant of
higher house prices during the boom (e.g., Bernanke (2005), Himmelberg, Mayer, and Sinai (2005),
Bernanke (2008), Taylor (2009), Adam, Marcet, and Kuang (2011)). In a similar spirit, Caballero
and Krishnamurthy (2009) identify the start of the housing boom with the Asian ￿nancial crisis
which fueled the demand for U.S. risk-free assets. In their model, Asian savers turn to U.S. assets,
resulting in a net capital in￿ ow for the U.S. Global interest rates then fall in their model because
the U.S. economy is presumed to grow more slowly than the rest of the world.
Laibson and Mollerstrom (2010) have criticized the global savings glut hypothesis by noting
that an increase in world-wide savings should have led to an investment boom in countries that
were large importers of capital, notably the U.S. Instead, the U.S. experienced a consumption boom
that accompanied the housing boom, suggesting that saving world-wide was not unusually high.
Laibson and Mollerstrom (2010) present an alternative interpretation of the correlation between
home values and capital ￿ ows during the boom based on asset bubbles. Assuming a bubble in the
housing market, they argue that the rise in housing wealth generated by the bubble led to higher
consumption, which in turn led to greater borrowing from abroad and a substantial net capital
in￿ ow to the U.S. A similar idea is presented in Ferrero (2011), but without the bubble. Ferrero
studies a two-sector representative-agent model of international trade in which lower collateral
6requirements facilitate access to external funding and drive up house prices.
Others have argued that preference shocks and a desire for smooth (across goods) consumption
can generate a correlation between house prices and capital in￿ ows. Gete (2010) shows that
consumption smoothing across tradeable (non-housing) goods and nontradable (housing) goods
can lead to a positive correlation between house prices and current account de￿cits. With an
exogenous increase in the home country￿ s preference for housing, productive inputs in the home
country are reallocated toward housing production, so that housing consumption can rise. But
with a preference for smooth consumption across goods, the tradeable non-housing good (presumed
identical across countries) will then be imported from abroad, leading to capital in￿ ows to the home
country.
The theories above fall into two broad categories: those that rely on higher domestic demand
to drive both house prices and capital in￿ ows in the same direction (Gete (2010), Laibson and
Mollerstrom (2010), Ferrero (2011)), and those that rely on capital in￿ ow-driven low interest rates
to drive up house prices (Bernanke (2005), Himmelberg, Mayer, and Sinai (2005), Bernanke (2008),
Taylor (2009), Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2009), Adam, Marcet, and Kuang (2011)). While
these papers were motivated by observations on housing and capital ￿ ows during the housing boom,
they also have implications for the housing bust. The former imply that the housing bust should be
associated with a reversal of domestic demand, leading to a capital out￿ ow. The latter imply that
the housing bust should be associated with a rise in real interest rates, correlated with a capital
out￿ ow.
As we show below, recent data pose a number of challenges to these theories. First, while it
is true that real interest rates were low throughout the boom period, they have remained low and
even fallen further in the bust period. Second, while capital certainly ￿ owed into countries like the
U.S. during the boom period, there is no evidence of a clear reversal in this trend during the bust
period.3 These observations suggest that the economic and political forces responsible for driving
capital ￿ ows and house prices over the entire period were, to a large extent, distinct. Below we
present empirical evidence that neither capital in￿ ows nor real interest rates bear a strong relation
to house prices in a sample that includes both the boom and the bust.
We interpret these recent events through the lens of the theoretical models in FLVNa and
FLVNb, focusing speci￿cally on the model in FLVNa in which a FML and its reversal are studied.
Rather than reproducing the mathematical description of the model here, we simply describe it
verbally and refer the reader to the original papers for details. Our focus here is on empirical
evidence relating home prices to various indicators as a means of distinguishing among theories.
Next we describe the model in FLVNa, and explain how it di⁄ers from the theories above.
3Some empirical studies document a positive correlation between house prices and capital in￿ ows to the U.S.,
but these studies typically have data samples that terminate at the end of the boom or shortly thereafter (e.g.,
Aizenman and Jinjarak (2009), Kole and Martin (2009)).
72.1 The Housing Boom-Bust: A Theory of Time-Varying Risk-Premia
FLVNa study a two-sector general equilibrium model of housing and non-housing production where
heterogenous households face limited risk-sharing opportunities as a result of incomplete ￿nancial
markets. A house in the model is a residential durable asset that provides utility to the household, is
illiquid (expensive to trade), and can be used as collateral in debt obligations. The model economy
is populated by a large number of overlapping generations of households who receive utility from
both housing and nonhousing consumption and who face a stochastic life-cycle earnings pro￿le.
We introduce market incompleteness by modeling heterogeneous agents who face idiosyncratic
and aggregate risks against which they cannot perfectly insure, and by imposing collateralized
borrowing constraints on households.
Within the context of this model, FLVNa focus on the macroeconomic consequences of three
systemic changes in housing ￿nance, with an emphasis on how these factors a⁄ect risk premia
in housing markets, and how risk premia in turn a⁄ect home prices. First, FLVNa investigate
the impact of changes in housing collateral requirements.4 Second, they investigate the impact of
changes in housing transactions costs. Taken together, these two factors represent the theoretical
counterpart to the real-world FML discussed above. Third, FLVNa investigate the impact of an in-
￿ ux of foreign capital into the domestic bond market. FLVNa argue that all three factors ￿ uctuate
over time and changed markedly during and preceding the period of rapid home price appreciation
from 2000-2006, and the subsequent bust. In particular, the boom period was marked by a wide-
spread relaxation of collateralized borrowing constraints and declining housing transactions costs
(including costs associated with mortgage borrowing, home equity extraction, and re￿nance). The
period was also marked by a sustained depression of long-term interest rates that coincided with a
vast in￿ ow of capital into U.S. safe bond markets. In the aftermath of the credit crisis that began
in 2007, the erosion in credit standards and transactions costs has been sharply reversed.5 We
provide evidence on this below.
The main impetus for rising price-rent ratios in the model in the boom period is the simultaneous
occurrence of positive economic shocks and a ￿nancial market liberalization, phenomena that
generate an endogenous decline in risk premia on housing and equity assets. As risk premia fall,
the aggregate house price index relative to aggregate rent, rises. A FML reduces risk premia for
two reasons, both of which are related to the ability of heterogeneous households to insure against
aggregate and idiosyncratic risks. First, lower collateral requirements directly increase access to
4Ferrero (2011) also assumes a relaxation of credit constraints to explain the housing boom. A key distinction
between his model and FLVNa, however, is that Ferrero studies a two-country representative agent model, so an
increase in borrowing by the domestic agent is only possible with increase in lending from rest of the world, hence
a higher current account de￿cit. By contrast, in FLVNa, borrowing and lending can happen within the domestic
economy between heterogeneous agents, so housing ￿nance need not be tied to foreign savings. Thus, a reversal of
the FML in a setting like that of Ferrero￿ s would necessitate a capital out￿ ow, whereas in FLVNa it does not.
5Streitfeld (2009) argues that, since the credit crisis, borrowing restrictions and credit constraints have become
even more stringent than historical norms in the pre-boom period.
8credit, which acts as a bu⁄er against unexpected income declines. Second, lower transactions costs
reduce the expense of obtaining the collateral required to increase borrowing capacity and provide
insurance. These factors lead to an increase in risk-sharing, or a decrease in the cross-sectional
variance of marginal utility. The housing bust is caused by a reversal of the FML and of the
positive economic shocks and an endogenous decrease in borrowing capacity as collateral values
fall. These factors lead to an accompanying rise in housing risk premia, driving the house price-rent
ratio lower. Almost all of the theories discussed above are silent on the role of housing risk premia
in driving house price ￿ uctuations.6
It is important to note that the rise in price-rent ratios caused by a ￿nancial market liberalization
in FLVNa must be attributed to a decline in risk premia and not to a fall in interest rates. Indeed,
the very changes in housing ￿nance that accompany a ￿nancial market liberalization drive the
endogenous interest rate up, rather than down. It follows that, if price-rent ratios rise after a
￿nancial market liberalization, it must be because the decline in risk premia more than o⁄sets
the rise in equilibrium interest rates that is attributable to the FML. This aspect of a FML
underscores the importance of accounting properly for the role of foreign capital over the housing
cycle. Without an infusion of foreign capital, any period of looser collateral requirements and
lower housing transactions costs (such as that which characterized the housing boom) would be
accompanied by an increase in equilibrium interest rates, as households endogenously respond to
the improved risk-sharing opportunities a⁄orded by a ￿nancial market liberalization by reducing
precautionary saving.
To model capital in￿ ows, FLVNa introduce foreign demand for the domestic riskless bond into
the market clearing condition. This foreign capital in￿ ow is modeled as driven by governmental
holders who inelastically place all of their funds in domestic riskless bonds. Foreign governmental
holders have a perfectly inelastic demand for safe securities and place all of their funds in those
securities, regardless of their price relative to other assets. Below we discuss data on U.S. inter-
national capital ￿ ows that supports this speci￿cation of the net capital ￿ ows in the United States
over the last 15 years.
The model in FLVNa implies that a rise in foreign purchases of domestic bonds, equal in
magnitude to those observed in the data from 2000-2010, leads to a quantitatively large decline in
the equilibrium real interest rate. Were this decline not accompanied by other, general equilibrium,
e⁄ects, it would lead to a signi￿cant housing boom in the model. But the general equilibrium e⁄ects
imply that a capital in￿ ow is unlikely to have a large e⁄ect on house prices even if it has a large
e⁄ect on interest rates. One reason for this involves the central role of time-varying housing risk
premia. In models where risk premia are held ￿xed, a decline in the interest rate of this magnitude
would be su¢ cient￿ by itself￿ to explain the rise in price-rent ratios observed from 2000-2006 under
6An exception is Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2009), but they do not study housing nor the FML and its
reversal.
9reasonable calibrations. But with time-varying housing risk premia, the result can be quite di⁄erent.
Foreign purchases of U.S. bonds crowd domestic savers out of the safe bond market, exposing them
to greater systematic risk in equity and housing markets. In response, risk premia on housing and
equity assets rise, substantially o⁄setting the e⁄ect of lower interest rates and limiting the impact
of foreign capital in￿ ows on home prices.
There is a second o⁄setting general equilibrium e⁄ect. Foreign capital in￿ ows also stimulate
residential investment, raising the expected stock of future housing and lowering the expected
future rental growth rate. Like risk premia, these expectations are re￿ ected immediately house
prices (pushing down the national house price-rent ratio), further limiting the impact of foreign
capital in￿ ows on home prices. The net e⁄ect of all of these factors is that a large capital in￿ ow
into safe securities has at most a small positive e⁄ect on house prices.
It is useful to clarify the two opposing forces simultaneously acting on housing risk premia
in the model of FLVNa. During the housing boom, there is both a FML and a capital in￿ ow.
As explained, the FML lowers risk premia, while foreign purchases of domestic safe assets raise
risk premia. Under the calibration of the model, the decline in risk premia resulting from the
FML during the boom period is far greater than the rise in risk premia resulting from the capital
in￿ ow. On the whole, therefore, risk premia on housing assets fall, and this is the most important
contributing factor to the an increase in price-rent ratios during the boom. During the bust,
modeled as a reversal of the FML but not the capital in￿ ows, risk premia unambiguously rise even
as interest rates remain low. The rise in risk premia drives the decline in house-price rent ratios.
These features of the model represent signi￿cant di⁄erences from other theories of capital ￿ ows
and house prices. They permit the model to explain not just the housing boom, but also the
housing bust, in which house price-rent ratios fell dramatically even though interest rates remained
low and there has been no clear reversal in the trend toward capital in￿ ows into the U.S. bond
market. Moreover, they underscore the importance of distinguishing between interest rate changes
(which are endogenous) and credit supply. In the absence of a capital in￿ ow, an expansion of
credit supply in the form of lower collateral requirements and lower transactions costs should lead,
in equilibrium, to higher interest rates, rather than lower, as households respond to the improved
risk-sharing/insurance opportunities by reducing precautionary saving. Instead we observed low
real interest rates, generated in the model of FLVNa by foreign capital in￿ ows, but the in￿ ows
themselves are not the key factor behind the housing boom-bust.
To illustrate the independent role of house prices and capital in￿ ows in the model, Figure 2
plots the transition dynamics for both the aggregate price-rent ratio and for foreign holdings of
domestic assets over the period 2000-2010 from the model of FLVNa. The ￿gure shows the dynamic
behavior of the price-rent ratio in response to a series of shocks designed to mimic both the state
of the economy and housing market conditions over the period 2000-2010. The economy begins
in year 2000 the stochastic steady state of a world with ￿normal￿ collateral requirements (i.e.,
10fraction of home value that must be held as collateral) and housing transactions costs calibrated to
roughly match the data prior to the housing boom of 2000-2006. In 2001, the economy undergoes an
unanticipated shift to a new steady state, in which there is a FML with lower collateral requirements
and lower transactions costs, calibrated to match the changes in these variables during the boom
period, as well as an unanticipated increase in foreign holdings of U.S. bonds from 0 to 16%
of GDP. This 16% increase is calibrated to match the actual increase in net foreign holdings of
U.S. securities over the period 2000-2010. Along the transition path, foreign holdings of bonds
are increased linearly from 0% to 16% of GDP from 2000 to 2010. The adjustment to the new
stochastic steady state is then traced out over the seven year period from 2001 to 2006, as the state
variables evolve. Finally, starting in 2007 and continuing through 2010, the economy is presumed
to undergo a surprise reversal of the ￿nancial market liberalization but not the foreign capital
in￿ ow.


























































Foreign holdings of safe securities, model
Figure 2: Price-Rent Ratio and Foreign Holdings in FLVNa. The ￿gure plots the transition dynamics of the
aggregate price-rent ratio and foreign holdings of the safe asset in the model of Favilukis, Ludvigson, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2009), for
the period 2000-2010. The dynamics are driven by a sequence of aggregate economic shocks designed to mimic the business cycle over
this period, a ￿nancial market liberalization in 2000, and a reversal of this liberalization in 2007, as well as the foreign ￿ows depicted in
the ￿gure. Source: Favilukis, Ludvigson, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2009).
Figure 2 shows that the house-price rent ratio rises by 39% over the period 2000-2006 and then
falls by 17% over the period 2006-2010. By contrast, foreign holdings of domestic riskless bonds,
denoted BF
t , rise at a constant rate throughout the boom-bust period. Although foreign holdings
rise mechanically over time and are crudely calibrated to match the long-term (trend) increase in
11holdings over the entire 10-year period (rather than matching the year-by-year ￿ uctuations), the
￿gure nevertheless shows that capital ￿ ows are not a key determinant of the boom-bust pattern
in the price-rent ratio in this model, despite the large decline in interest rates generated by these
in￿ ows. In the data, the increase in the price-rent ratio (series shown in Figure 1) over the period
2000:Q4 to 2006:Q4 is 49.9% (calculated same way as in model), while over the bust (2006:Q4-
2010:Q4) it declined 34.0%. The model captures 78% of the run-up in this measure and 49% of
the decline.
The relationship between capital in￿ ows and risk premia in FLVNa and FLVNb is worthy of
emphasis. In equilibrium, higher capital in￿ ows into the safe bond market raise risk premia on
housing and equity, rather than lower them. This runs contrary to the argument, made by some,
that the free ￿ ow of capital across borders should be associated with a reduction in risk premia
(e.g., Geithner (2007)). Here, foreign purchases of the safe asset make both equity and housing
assets more risky. Both the risk premium and Sharpe ratio for equity and housing rise when there
is a capital in￿ ow, for two reasons. First, the increase in foreign money forces domestic residents
as a whole to take a leveraged position in the risky assets. This by itself increases the volatility of
asset and housing returns, translating into higher risk premia. Second, domestic savers are crowded
out of the bond market by foreign governmental holders who are willing to hold the safe asset at
any price. As a result, they become more exposed to systematic risk in the equity and housing
markets. This means that the equity and housing Sharpe ratios must rise, as domestic savers
shift the composition of their ￿nancial wealth towards risky securities. In addition, the volatility
of the stochastic discount factor rises and there is a decrease in risk-sharing, as measured by the
cross-sectional variance of marginal utility growth.
Of course, the e⁄ect of a capital in￿ ow on house prices depends not only on the housing risk
premium, but also on the risk-free interest rate. Although a capital in￿ ow drives the housing risk
premium up, in the model of FLVNa it drives the risk-free rate down by more, so a capital in￿ ow
still leads to a modest increase in the price-rent ratio.7 In this model, an in￿ ow of foreign capital
calibrated to match the increase in foreign ownership of U.S. Treasuries and U.S. agency debt over
the period 2000-2010 has a large downward impact on the equilibrium interest rate, which falls
from 3.45% to 0.39%. The magnitude of this decline is close to the reduction in real rates observed
in U.S. bond market data over the period 2000-2006.
With this discussion as theoretical background, we now turn to an analysis of the data on
capital ￿ ows, interest rates, and credit standards over the boom-bust period.
7Changes in expected future aggregate rent growth also can e⁄ect the price-rent ratio. The numbers here refer
to a comparison of stochastic steady states, however, in which the expected rental growth rate is the same in both
steady states (equal to the deterministic growth rate of the economy).
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While the notion of a global savings glut is controversial, recent data clearly suggest a reallocation
of savings away from the developed world, and toward the developing world, the so-called global
imbalances phenomenon. Unlike any prior period, global ￿nancial integration allowed for the
channeling of one country￿ s excess savings towards another country￿ s real estate boom. Such
￿nancing occurred directly, for example by German banks￿purchases of U.S. subprime securities,
but also indirectly through the U.S. Treasury and Agency bond markets. As the world￿ s sole
supplier of a global reserve currency, the U.S. experienced a surge in foreign ownership of U.S.
Treasuries and Agency bonds. Agency bonds refers to the debt of the two government-sponsored
enterprises (GSEs) Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, as well as to the mortgage-backed securities
that they issue and guarantee. Due to their ambivalent private-public structure and their history
as agencies of the federal government, private market investors (including foreign investors) have
always assumed that the debt of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae was implicitly backed by the U.S.
Treasury. That implicit backing became an explicit backing in September 2008 when Freddie
Mac and Fannie Mae were taken into government conservatorship. See Acharya, Richardson, Van
Nieuwerburgh, and White (2011) for details on the GSEs.
In this section, we discuss in detail data showing the trends in capital ￿ ows, U.S. real inter-
est rates, and the relaxation and subsequent tightening of housing credit constraints and credit
standards.
3.1 International Capital Flows
The Treasury International Capital (TIC) reporting system is the o¢ cial source of U.S. securities
￿ ows data. It reports monthly data (with a six week lag) on foreigners purchases and sales of
all types of ￿nancial securities (equities, corporate, Agency, and Treasury bonds). We refer to
these monthly transactions data as the TIC ￿ows data. The TIC system also produces periodic
benchmark surveys of the market value of foreigners￿net holdings, or net asset positions, in U.S.
securities. Unlike the ￿ ows data, these data take into account the net capital gains on gross foreign
assets and liabilities. We refer to these as the TIC holdings data. The holdings data are collected
in detailed surveys conducted in December of 1978, 1984, 1989, and 1994, in March 2000, and
annually in June from 2002 to 2010. The survey data on holdings is thought to be of higher
quality than the ￿ ows data because it more accurately accounts for valuation e⁄ects (Warnock and
Warnock (2009)).8
The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) in the U.S. Department of Commerce also provides
8As explained in Warnock and Warnock (2009), reporting to the surveys is mandatory, with penalties for non-
compliance, and the data are subjected to extensive analysis and editing. Data on foreign holdings of U.S. securities
are available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/Pages/index.aspx.
13annual estimates of the value of accumulated stocks (holdings) of U.S.-owned assets abroad and of
foreign-owned assets in the United States. We will refer to these as the BEA holdings data. These
include estimates of holdings of securities, based on the TIC data, as well as estimates of holdings
of other assets such as foreign direct investment, U.S. o¢ cial reserves and other U.S. government
reserves. We refer to the sum of these other assets plus ￿nancial securities as total assets. In recent
data, the main di⁄erence between the BEA estimate of net foreign holdings of total assets and
its estimate of net foreign holdings of total securities is attributable to foreign direct investment
(FDI), where, since 2006, the value of U.S. FDI abroad has exceeded the value of foreign FDI in
the U.S.9
The BEA de￿nes the U.S. net international investment position (NIIP) as the value of U.S.-
owned assets abroad minus foreign-owned assets in the U.S. The overall change in the NIIP incorpo-
rates capital gains and losses on the prior stock of holdings of assets. Thus, the total change in U.S.
gross foreign assets equals net purchases by U.S. residents plus any capital gains on the prior stock
of gross foreign assets, while the total change in U.S. foreign liabilities equals net sales of assets to
foreign residents plus any capital gains accrued to foreigners on their U.S. assets. The change in
the NIIP is the di⁄erence between the two. Capital gains are the most important component of
valuation changes on the NIIP.
The BEA also collects quarterly and annual estimates of transactions with foreigners, including
trade in goods and services, receipts and payments of income, transfers, and transactions in ￿nancial
assets. We refer to these as the BEA transactions data. The transactions data measure the current
account (CA). Since the CA transactions data only measure purchases and sales of assets, they do
not adjust for valuation e⁄ects that must be taken into account in constructing the international
investment positions (holdings) of the U.S., as just discussed.10
When thinking about the recent boom-bust period in residential real estate, a question arises
as to which measure of capital ￿ ows to study. Obstfeld (2011) documents an increase in the
sheer volume of ￿nancial trade across borders, and argues that it could be positively correlated
with ￿nancial instability. Moreover, he shows that the amplitude of pure valuation changes in the
NIIP has grown in tandem with the volumes of gross ￿ ows. Because the CA ignores such valuation
changes, our preferred measure would therefore be a measure of total changes in net foreign holdings
of assets rather than changes in net transactions. Unfortunately, data on net foreign asset holdings
are only readily available in the U.S., and then only annually. (For the empirical work below, we
construct our own quarterly estimate of these holdings for securities.) Outside the U.S., only the
transactions-based CA data are available. Thus, when we use international data we use the CA as
a measure of capital ￿ ows, bearing in mind the limitations of these data for measuring changes in
actual asset holdings.
9These data are available at http://www.bea.gov/international/index.htm.
10See the adjustments for valuations e⁄ects at http://www.bea.gov/international/xls/intinv10_t3.xls.
14Since net foreign asset holdings data are available for the U.S., when working with U.S. data
we focus most on net foreign holdings as a measure of capital ￿ ows (although for completeness
we also present empirical results using the CA as a measure of capital ￿ ows). Within net foreign
holdings, we focus on changes in holdings of ￿nancial securities, rather than changes in holdings
of total assets. We argue that the former are far more relevant for residential real estate than the
latter. Recall that the most important di⁄erence between the two, especially in recent data, is
attributable to ￿ ows in FDI. But it is unclear how relevant FDI is for the housing market. For
example, during much of the housing boom, the value of net foreign holdings on FDI fell, implying
a net capital out￿ow on those types of assets. This fact is hardly consistent with the notion that
capital in￿ows to the U.S. helped ￿nance the housing boom.
What ￿ owed in during the housing boom was foreign capital directed at U.S. Treasuries and
Agency securities. There are several reasons we expect these assets￿ unlike FDI￿ to be directly
related to the U.S. housing market. First, foreign purchases of Agency securities allowed the
government sponsored enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to broaden their market
for mortgage-backed securities (MBS) to international investors, funding the mortgage investments
themselves. Thus, an in￿ ow of capital into U.S. Agencies can in turn free up U.S. banks to fund
additional mortgages. Second, because mortgage rates are often tied to Treasury rates, large
foreign Treasury purchases could in principle directly a⁄ect house prices through their e⁄ect on
interest rates. And, low Treasury rates could lead U.S. banks in search of yield to undertake more
risky mortgage investments (see Maddaloni and Peydro (2011) for evidence that banks increase the
riskiness of investments in low interest rate environments). In summary, because the FDI streams
are largely divorced from the U.S. housing market, the most appropriate measure of capital ￿ ows
for our purpose is not net foreign holdings of total assets but instead total securities.
Figure 3 shows the movement in various measures of international capital ￿ ows into the United
States, relative to trend GDP, in annual data from 1976 to 2010. Plotted are the change in net
foreign holdings of total assets, total securities, and in what we will call U.S. ￿safe￿ securities
(de￿ned as Treasuries and Agencies). We refer to a capital in￿ ow as a positive change in holdings,
and vice versa for a capital out￿ ow. Also plotted is the current account de￿cit. Figure 3 shows
that there is considerable volatility in these measures during housing boom and the subsequent
￿nancial crisis, with particularly sharp increases in the change in net foreign holdings of U.S. assets
from 2007 to 2008. This corresponds to an upward spike in the change in the U.S. net foreign
liability position in 2008 (change in net foreign holdings of total assets in the ￿gure). This series
declines from 2008 to 2009 and increases again from 2009 to 2010. Comparing the end-points of
these series in 2010 to their values in 2006, we see that￿ by any measure of assets￿ in￿ ows (or the
change in holdings) were higher at the end of the sample in 2010 than they were at the peak of the
housing boom at the beginning of 2006 (end of 2005).
To get a better sense of the trends in these series, Figure 4 plots the same measures of interna-
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Figure 3: Measures of U.S. Capital Flows. Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Net foreign holdings of total assets is foreign-owned assets in the United States minus U.S.-owned assets abroad. Net foreign holdings
of total securities is de￿ned as foreign-owned U.S. government securities plus U.S. Treasury securities plus U.S. securities other than
Treasury securities minus U.S.-owned foreign securities. Net foreign holdings of safe securities is de￿ned as U.S. government securities
plus Treasury securities. (We do not subtract o⁄ U.S. holdings of foreign government securities, since these carry at least exchange rate
risk.) The current account de￿cit is imports of goods and services and income payments less exports of goods and services and income
receipts less net unilateral current transfers. All series are expressed relative to trend GDP (obtained from a Hodrick-Prescott trend).
The sample is annual, 1976-2010.
tional capital ￿ ows, but computed as four-year moving averages. The ￿gure shows that changes in
net foreign holdings of total assets show little trend movement over the entire boom-bust period
2000-2010, but if anything they trended up during the bust period from 2006 to 2010, while they
trended down in the boom from 2002 to 2006. A similar pattern holds for net foreign holdings of
total securities, except that here, in￿ ows are much more sharply positive during the housing bust
period. So where are the in￿ ows during the housing boom? In U.S. safe securities.
The only assets for which we observe a signi￿cant increase in capital in￿ ows during the boom
period are those we de￿ned above as U.S. safe securities, comprised of Treasury and Agency debt.
We have argued above that these assets are likely to be the most relevant for housing markets, and
indeed the change in net foreign holdings of these securities was positive and increasing throughout
the boom period, from 2001 through the beginning of 2006, which we take as the peak of the
housing boom. At the same time, however, in￿ ows into these securities, like the other categories
of assets, continued to rise during the bust period, implying that the U.S. borrowing from abroad
16in these securities increased further from the beginning of 2006 to end 2010, rather than declined.
The only measure in Figure 4 that suggests a decline in the rate at which the U.S. is borrowing
from abroad is the current account de￿cit, pointing to a signi￿cant incongruence with the holdings
data. (We discuss this further below.) Despite the volatility in the holdings data, the bust period
still exhibited relatively high average in￿ ows of foreign capital into all forms of U.S. securities,
mirroring capital gains on U.S. Liabilities relative to U.S. assets abroad, as well as a net ￿ ight into
U.S. safe securities, in 2008. The CA de￿cit (or, equivalently, the capital account) omits these
signi￿cant valuation changes during the ￿nancial crisis. We view this as a serious shortcoming of
the CA as a measure of international capital ￿ ows, since such valuation adjustments surely have
wealth e⁄ects that in general equilibrium would in￿ uence the extent to which U.S. households can
consume at rates that exceed domestic income. At the end of the sample in 2010, Figure 4 shows
that there is a decline in the (moving average trend) in￿ ows to total assets from the end of 2008
to the end of 2010. But this decline is barely discernible in total securities and is not at all present
in U.S. safe securities. The discrepancy is again net ￿ ows into FDI, which we￿ ve argued above are
largely divorced from the housing market.
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Figure 4: Measures of U.S. Capital Flows, 4-Year Moving Average. Notes: see Figure 3. Source: U.S. Department
of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. The sample is annual, 1980-2010.
How can we reconcile the large decline in the current account de￿cit from the end of 2005 to the
end of 2010, with the observation that the change in net foreign holdings of total U.S. assets rose
over this period (Figure 3)? Comparing 2010 to 2005 (year end), the current account de￿cit fell by
17$274,876 million, while the year-end change in net foreign holdings of total U.S. assets (relative to
trend GDP) rose by $395,440 million. The discrepancy is attributable to valuation e⁄ects, which
the current account ignores. Indeed, 126% of the discrepancy over this period is attributable to
valuation e⁄ects (-26% is attributable to a statistical discrepancy and other small adjustments
between the current and capital account ￿ ows). Thus, the decline in the current account de￿cit
from 2005 to 2010 suggests a decline in the rate at which U.S. liabilities are increasing, when
in fact this rate has increased, primarily because the change in capital gains foreign residents
enjoyed on U.S. assets from 2005 to 2010 far exceeded the change in capital gains accruing to
U.S. residents on their assets abroad. But these valuation adjustments came primarily from assets
other than what we have de￿ned as U.S. safe assets. (This is perhaps not surprising since these
assets are far less volatile than is risky capital.) A break-down suggests that only 15.6% of these
valuation adjustments (speci￿cally of the change in these adjustments from 2005 to 2010) came
from adjustments on U.S. safe assets. A much larger 39.7% came from ￿nancial securities other
than safe securities, and the majority (44.7%) came from valuation adjustments on assets other
than ￿nancial securities (including both safe and non-safe ￿nancial securities).
We can also compute the fraction of the cumulative change in net foreign holdings of safe assets
from the end of 2005 to the end of 2010 that is attributable valuation changes versus transactions.
Over this period, transactions account for 92.6%, while valuation changes account for just 7.3%.
This shows that, even accumulating over the entire bust period, there continues to be a strong
in￿ ow of capital into U.S. safe securities that is not attributable merely to valuation changes.
To summarize, during the housing boom, only U.S. capital in￿ ows on securities (equities,
corporate, U.S. Agency and Treasury bills and bonds) show any discernible upward trend. Among
securities, the upward trend has been driven almost entirely by an increase in net foreign holdings
of U.S. safe assets, speci￿cally U.S. Treasury and Agency debt. Yet net in￿ ows on these securities,
rather than declining during the housing bust, have continued to increase.
We now provide more detail on the ￿ ows to U.S. safe securities. To get a better sense of the
quantitative importance of these ￿ ows to U.S. safe assets, the solid line of Figure 5, measured
against the left axis, plots the combined foreign holdings in billions of U.S. dollars of short-term
and long-term U.S. Treasuries and Agencies. The dashed line, measured against the right axis,
shows long-term (not short-term) Treasuries and Agencies relative to the amount of long-term
marketable debt outstanding. Figure 6 plots total foreign holdings of U.S. Treasuries and Agencies
relative to the size of the U.S. economy, measured as trend GDP.
The ￿gure shows that foreign holdings of U.S. Treasuries were modest until the mid 1990s. In
December 1994, foreign holdings of long-term Treasuries were $464bn, which amounted to 19.4% of
marketable Treasuries outstanding and to 6.4% of U.S. trend GDP. Foreign holdings of long-term
Agencies were $121bn, which amounted to 5.4% of outstanding Agencies and 1.5% of trend GDP.
Over the course of the Asian ￿nancial crisis, these holdings doubled. By March 2000, towards the


























































































Figure 5: Foreign Holdings of U.S. Safe Assets. The ￿gure plots foreign holdings of U.S. Treasuries (squares) and
U.S. Agencies (circles). U.S. Agencies denotes both the corporate bonds issued by the Government Sponsored Enterprizes and the
mortgage-backed securities guaranteed by them. The solid lines denote the amount of long-term and short-term holdings, in billions
of U.S. dollars, as measured against the left axis. The dashed lines denote the long-term foreign holdings relative to the total amount
of outstanding long-term (marketable) debt. Source: U.S. Treasury International Capital System￿ s annual survey of foreign portfolio
holdings of U.S. securities. The foreign holdings data are available for December 1974, 1978, 1984, 1989, 1994, 1997, March 2000, and
annually from June 2002 until June 2010.
end of the crisis, foreign holdings of long-term Treasuries and Agencies were $884bn and $261bn,
respectively, corresponding to 35.3% and 7.3% of the amounts outstanding. Total foreign holdings
of Treasuries and Agencies increased from 9.8% to 14.8% of trend GDP. Caballero, Fahri, and
Gourinchas (2008) argue that the Asian ￿nancial crisis represented a negative shock to the supply
of (investable/pledgeable) assets in East Asia, and led their investors to increase their investments
in U.S. bonds, one of the scarce risk-free assets available worldwide.
During housing boom from 2000-2006, the increase in foreign holdings of safe assets continued
at an even more rapid pace. Total foreign holdings of Treasuries and Agencies more than doubled
from $1,418bn in March 2000 to $3,112 in June 2006. Foreign holdings of long-term Treasuries went
from 35.3% to 52.0% of the total amount of Treasuries outstanding, while holdings of long-term
Agencies went from 7.3% to 17.2%. Most of the rise in foreign holdings of Treasuries took place
by 2004, while most of the rise in Agencies took place from 2004 to 2006. Total foreign holdings
of Treasuries and Agencies increased from 14.8% to 23.7% of trend GDP. The boom in U.S. house
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Figure 6: Foreign Holdings Relative to GDP. The solid line denotes foreign holdings of U.S. Treasuries and Agencies
relative to U.S. trend GDP (squares). Trend GDP is computed with a Hodrick-Prescott ￿lter (Hodrick and Prescott (1997)). The
dashed line (stars) asks what the foreign holdings relative to trend GDP would have been if the foreign holdings relative to the amount
of debt outstanding declined the amount they did, but the amount of debt outstanding relative to trend GDP was held at 2008 values
for the years 2009 and 2010. The foreign holdings data are available for December 1974, 1978, 1984, 1989, 1994, 1997, March 2000, and
annually from June 2002 until June 2010.
prices, which started at the end of 1994 and accelerated after 2000, coincided with a massive in￿ ow
of foreign capital in safe U.S. assets.
At the same time, however, capital in￿ ows in the U.S. safe assets continued to rise during the
housing bust and ￿nancial crisis. Figure 5 shows that between June 2006 and June 2010, total
foreign holdings of Treasuries and Agencies rose from $3,112bn to $5,232bn, or from 23.7% to
35.5% of trend GDP. The share of outstanding long-term Treasuries held by foreign investors also
increased from 52.0% in 2006 to 61.1% in 2008 before falling back to 53.0% in 2010. The reduction
in 2010 is attributable to large increase in the total quantity of marketable Treasuries outstanding
in 2009 and 2010 (which rose from 33.2% of trend GDP in 2008 to 54.9% in 2010), rather than
to a reduction in nominal foreign holdings. The latter actually continued to increase rapidly from
$2,211bn in 2008 to $3,343bn in 2010. The dashed line in Figure 6 is a foreign holdings-to-trend
GDP series that we have adjusted in 2009 and 2010 to re￿ ect the large increase in the quantity of
Treasury debt outstanding that occurred in 2009 and 2010. The adjusted series equals the level
of foreign holdings as a fraction of trend GDP that would have occurred in 2009 and 2010 had
Treasury debt outstanding as a fraction of trend GDP been ￿xed at its 2008 level. The dashed
20line shows that the increase in foreign holdings of U.S. Treasuries in 2009 and 2010 is less than
proportional to the increase in outstanding Treasuries over those years. In this relative sense,
therefore, foreigners have become less willing to hold U.S. Treasuries. According to the adjusted
series there is a reduction in foreign holdings as a fraction of trend GDP, from 30.0% of trend
GDP in 2008, to 24.6% in 2010, suggesting that a substantial ￿unwind￿of foreign positions in U.S.
Treasuries may be underway, at least relative to the total amount of U.S. debt being issued.
Although there has so far been no reduction in nominal foreign holdings of U.S. Treasuries
during the housing bust, the ￿nancial crisis did lead to a substantial reduction in nominal foreign
holdings of U.S. Agencies. While foreign holdings of Agencies still rose from 17.2% in 2006 to 20.8%
of the amount outstanding in 2008, they fell back sharply to 15.6% of the amount outstanding in
2010 even as the amount outstanding remained ￿ at.
Foreign O¢ cial Holdings An important aspect of recent patterns in international capital ￿ ows
is that foreign demand for U.S. Treasury securities is dominated by Foreign O¢ cial Institutions.
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2010) ￿nd that demand for U.S. Treasury securities by
governmental holders is extremely inelastic, implying that when these holders receive funds to
invest they buy U.S. Treasuries, regardless of their price. As explained in Kohn (2002), government
entities have speci￿c regulatory and reserve currency motives for holding U.S. Treasuries and face
both legal and political restrictions on the type of assets that can be held, forcing them into safe
securities.
Data from the TIC system breaks out what share of foreign holdings of U.S. Treasuries is
attributable to Foreign O¢ cial Institutions, which are government entities, mostly central banks.
Foreign O¢ cial Institutions own the vast majority of U.S. Treasuries in recent data: in June 2010
Foreign O¢ cial Institutions held 75% of all foreign holdings of U.S. Treasuries. That share has
always been high and has risen from 58% in March 2000 to 75% in June 2010. Indeed, 75%
represents a lower bound on the fraction of such securities held by Foreign O¢ cial Institutions,
since some prominent foreign governments purchase U.S. securities through o⁄shore centers and
third-country intermediaries, purchases that would not be attributed to Foreign O¢ cial entities by
the TIC system￿ see Warnock and Warnock (2009). Foreign O¢ cial Institutions also accounted for
64% of the foreign holdings of Agencies in June 2010.
Asian central banks (China, Japan, Korea) have acquired massive U.S. dollar reserves in the
process of stabilizing their exchange rate. The share of foreign holdings is higher for long-term than
for short-term securities. The left panel of Figure 7 shows the foreign holdings as of December
2010 by country groups. China excludes Hong Kong, which is part of Rest of Asia. Banking
centers consist of the United Kingdom, the Caribbean, Luxembourg, Belgium, and Ireland. It is
widely believed that China holds a non-trivial fraction of its safe dollar assets through ￿nancial
intermediaries in the U.K. and in other banking centers Warnock (2010). The graph then suggests
21that as much as two-thirds of safe U.S. assets is held by Asian countries. China (narrowly de￿ned)
held nearly $1,500bn in Treasuries and Agencies in June 2010; Japan held nearly $1,000bn.
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Foreign Holdings by Maturity
 June 2009
Figure 7: Foreign Holdings By Maturity and By Country. The left panel shows the share of foreign holdings of
U.S. Treasuries and Agencies for di⁄erent maturity ranges, expressed in years. The data are for June 2009 (Table 14a of the 2009 TICS
report). 51% of the Agency holdings are reported to be of maturity 25-30 years. These are 30-year mortgage backed securities, which
have a nominal maturity of 30 years but an e⁄ective maturity of about 7 years because of prepayment. We reallocate these 30-year
Agency holdings across maturities so that they have a weighted average maturity (WAM) of 7 years. The resulting series for the maturity
of foreign holdings of U.S. Agencies has a WAM of 6.4 years instead of the original 17.7 years. Total long-term foreign holdings have a
WAM of 5.2 years. Once we add the short-term Treasury holdings, which are 1-year or less in maturity, the WAM drops to 4.6 years.
The right panel shows the foreign holdings as of December 2010 by country groups. China excludes Hong Kong, which is part of Rest
of Asia. Banking centers consist of the United Kingdom, the Caribbean, Luxembourg, Belgium, and Ireland.
The right panel of Figure 7 shows the share of foreign holdings of U.S. Treasuries and Agencies
for di⁄erent maturity ranges, expressed in years. The data are for June 2009. As the caption
explains, the maturity of the Agency holdings is adjusted to account for the prepayment option
embedded in mortgage-backed securities. Total long-term and short-term foreign holdings have
a weighted average maturity of 4.6 years. About a quarter of foreign holdings have a maturity
of one year or less. Fully half of all holdings have a maturity below 3 years. This suggests that
a substantial reduction in foreign holdings of U.S. safe assets could occur over a relatively short
period without an outright ￿re-sale of long-term bonds, if current holders simply stopped rolling
over existing positions.
Longer Term Trends in Net Foreign Holdings of Securities We have emphasized the
special relevance for the U.S. housing boom-bust cycle of U.S. securities considered to be safe
stores-of-value (i.e., U.S. Treasury and Agency debt). But is worth emphasizing that, even over
a longer period of time, foreign holdings of these securities behave similarly to total net foreign
22holdings of all securities. The reason is that foreign holdings of U.S. securities other than Treasuries
and Agencies are roughly equal in magnitude to U.S. holdings of securities abroad. Figure 8 makes
this point visually; net foreign holdings of all securities other than U.S. Treasury and Agency debt
as a fraction of U.S. Trend GDP have hovered close to zero since 1994, even as net foreign holdings
of safe securities have soared. This shows that all of the long term upward trend in net foreign
holdings of U.S. securities since 1994 has been the result of an upward trend in net foreign holdings
of U.S. safe securities; net foreign holdings of other securities are almost exactly zero in June
of 2010. Thus the long term downward trend in the U.S. net international investment position
is well described by the foreign holdings of U.S. safe assets. Of the safe assets foreigners hold,
70%, on average over the period 1994-2010, are held in U.S. Treasuries. The large U.S. current
account de￿cits in the boom period are, to a large extent, the mirror image of the increase in
foreign holdings of U.S. safe assets.11 This is true in the aggregate net ￿ ows to the U.S., but also
for China. China￿ s cumulative current account surplus between 2003 and 2007 largely matches up
with its acquisitions of U.S. Treasuries and Agencies (Bernanke (2011)).




















































Figure 8: Net Foreign Holdings Relative to U.S. Trend GDP. The solid line (squares) denotes total net foreign
holdings of long-term securities (the net foreign liability position of the U.S.) relative to U.S. trend GDP. Net foreign holdings are de￿ned
as foreign holdings of U.S. securities minus U.S. holdings of foreign securities. We de￿ne as net foreign holdings of safe securities to be
foreign holdings of U.S. Treasuries and Agencies. (We do not subtract o⁄ U.S. holdings of foreign government securities, since these
carry at least exchange rate risk.) The dotted line (stars) denotes the thus constructed net foreign holdings in safe securities, while the
dashed line (circles) denotes the net foreign holdings in all other securities. The data are from the U.S. Treasury International Capital
System￿ s annual survey of foreign portfolio holdings of U.S. securities. The data are available for December 1994, December 1997, March
2000, and annually from June 2002 until June 2010.
11Though, as discussed above, an important discrepancy between the current account data, based on transactions,
and the net foreign assets holdings data, is that the former do not fully adjust for valuation e⁄ects that are captured
in the international holdings data.
23Risky Mortgage Holdings Although net ￿ ows into securities other than Treasuries and Agen-
cies have hovered around zero, there were substantial gross ￿ ows across borders into private-label
products such as mortgage-backed securities (MBS), collateralized debt obligations (CDO), and
credit default swaps (CDS) with non-prime residential or commercial real estate as the underlying
or as the reference entity. Because an average of 80% of such private-label MBS principal received
a AAA rating from the credit ratings agencies and earned yields above those of Treasuries (see
U.S. Treasury Department (2011)), large foreign (as well as domestic) institutional investors were
able and willing to hold these assets on their books. The TICS data indicate that foreigners held
$594bn of non-agency mortgage-backed securities in June 2007. By June 2009, these holdings more
than halved to $266bn, after which they stabilized at $257bn in June 2010. Less than 10% of these
are held by foreign o¢ cial institutions (U.S. Treasury Department (2011)).
Bernanke (2011) shows interesting cross-country di⁄erences in the composition of countries￿
U.S. investment portfolio. China and emerging Asia held three-quarters of their U.S. investments
in the form of Treasuries and Agencies in 2007. Their share of all AAA-rated securities was 77.5%,
while the AAA-rated share of all U.S. securities outstanding was only 36%. European (as well
as domestic) investors held only about one-third of their U.S. portfolio in the form of AAA-rated
assets. Not only did Europeans invest in non-AAA corporate debt, they accumulated $500bn in
U.S. asset-backed (largely mortgage-backed) securities between 2003 and 2007.
In addition to their di⁄erent risk pro￿les over the housing cycle, Europe and Asia di⁄er by
their current account positions. While the Asian economies ran a large current account surplus,
￿nancing the purchases of U.S. assets with large trade surpluses, Europe had a balanced current
account over this period. It ￿nanced the purchases of risky U.S. assets by issuing external liabilities,
mostly equity, sovereign debt, and asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP). A prototypical example
of European holdings were AAA-rated tranches of subprime MBS held by large banks through
lightly-regulated o⁄-balance sheet vehicles, and ￿nanced with ABCP (Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez
(2010)).
3.2 U.S. Interest Rates
We have seen that the long term upward trend in net foreign holdings of U.S. securities since 1994
has been the result of an upward trend in net foreign holdings of U.S. safe securities. The rise in
net holdings by foreigners over time has coincided with downward trend in real interest rates, as
illustrated in Figure 9. The real annual interest rate on the 10-year Treasury bond fell from 3.78%
at the start of 2000 to 1.97% by the end of 2005, while the 10-year Treasury In￿ ation Protected
(TIPS) rate fell from 4.32% to 2.12% over this period. Real rates fell further to all time lows
during the housing bust. The real 10-year Treasury bond rate declined from 2.22% to -0.42% from
2006:Q1 to 2011:Q3, while the TIPS rate declined from 2.20% to 0.08%.
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Figure 9: U.S. Real Interest Rates. ￿10yr CMT real￿is the 10-year constant maturity Treasury bond rate minus expectations
of the average annual rate of CPI in￿ation over the next 10 years from the Survey of Professional Forecasters, in percent per annum.
Sources: U.S. Treasury, Survey of Professional Forecasters. ￿10yr TIPS￿is the yield on Treasury in￿ation protected securities (TIPS)
adjusted to constant maturities, corresponding to the third month of each quarter. Source: from 2003-2011, U.S. Treasury, from 1997
to 2002 data are obtained from J. Huston McCulloch, http://www.econ.ohio-state.edu/jhm/ts/ts.html. The complete sample runs from
1991:Q4 to 2011:Q3.
Empirically, Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack (2004) ￿nd evidence for lower Treasury yields around
periods of Japanese purchases of U.S. Treasuries in the 2000-2004 period, while Warnock and
Warnock (2009) estimate that 12-month ￿ ows equal to one percent of GDP are associated with
a 19 basis point reduction in long rates. They also ￿nd U.S. mortgage rates to be a⁄ected. The
e⁄ects are large. Had the twelve months ending in May 2005 seen zero foreign o¢ cial purchases of
U.S. Treasury and agency bonds, their results suggest that, ceteris paribus, U.S. long rates would
have been about 80 basis points higher.
3.3 Financial Market Liberalization
While there is little doubt that in￿ ows of foreign capital into U.S. Treasury and Agency markets
are associated with lower long-term real interest rates, there is no direct evidence that they have
played an important role in raising house prices during the boom. We argued above that there
are good theoretical reasons to doubt the hypothesis that lower interest rates had a quantitatively
25large e⁄ect on house prices during the boom. Empirically, Glaeser, Gottlieb, and Gyourko (2010)
concur and ￿nd that even when the house price impact of lower interest rates should be stronger
(at a low initial rate), they account for at most 1/5 of the observed change in housing prices. We
present additional evidence on this below.
What then accounts for the dramatic rise in U.S. house prices during the boom if not low
interest rates? A key missing element in this scenario is the shift in credit standards and housing
transactions costs, summarized above as a FML and its reversal. The widespread relaxation of
credit standards is well documented (see Nichols, Pennington-Cross, and Yezer (2005), Favilukis,
Ludvigson, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2009), Ferrero (2011) for more details). Moreover, a growing
body of empirical evidence directly links measures that identify changes in credit supply (as opposed
to changes in demand) to movements in asset prices.
3.3.1 Loan-to-Value Ratios
Many di⁄erent aspects of mortgage lending over the 2000-2010 period are consistent with a re-
laxation of credit standards. It may seem that an obvious way to measure relaxation of credit
standards is to study loan-to-value ratios. Several studies have observed that average or median
loan-to-value ratios did not increase much over time; see for example the contribution by Glaeser,
Gottlieb, and Gyourko (2010) in this volume. There are at least three problems with using average
LTV ratios as an indicator of tightness of credit constraints. First, average loan-to-value ratio mea-
sures usually mix in mortgages for house purchases with those for re￿nancing. The latter category
of have much lower LTV ratios because the borrowers often have accumulated substantial amounts
of home equity already. These re￿nancing are quantitatively important because, during the hous-
ing boom, mortgage interest rates came down persistently, leading to a massive re￿nancing boom.
The share of re￿s in originations was 63% in 2002, 72% in 2003, and around 50% in 2004-2006
(Inside Mortgage Finance data).
Second, the average loan-to-value ratio are typically based only on the ￿rst lien on the house.
But often, new borrowers would take out an 80% LTV ￿rst lien and then a second (and possibly
third) lien (closed-end second or home equity line of credit). By the end of 2006 households routinely
were able to buy homes with 100% or higher ￿nancing using a piggyback second mortgage or home
equity loan. The fraction of households with second liens rose dramatically during the boom. For
subprime loans, that fraction rose from 3% in 2002 to 30%; for Alt-A loans it rose from 3% to
44%.12 In addition, second or third liens were the often the way in which existing home owners
tapped into their home equity, often several quarters after they took out the original mortgage.
12An indirect indicator of the prevalence of the use of second mortgages is that the fraction of ￿rst liens with
LTV exactly equal to 80% rose substantially between 2002 and 2006 Krainer, LeRoy, and Munpyung (2009). They
show that the fraction of FRMs with exactly 80% LTV decreased from 22% to 6% over this period, the presumption
being that a rising share of these 80% LTV loans were associated with second liens.
26This equity extraction through second liens is in addition to extraction via cash-out re￿nancing,
another innovation of the boom which became increasingly prevalent. The contribution in this
volume by Lee, Mayer, and Tracy (2011) shows that second lien balances grew from about $200
billion at the start of 2002 to over $1 trillion by the end of 2007. It also shows that the prevalence
of second mortgages rose in every U.S. region from below 10% at the start of the boom (bit higher
in coastal cyclical markets) to around 40% in 2006 (except for the Midwest declining region which
peaks at a 20% share).
What this evidence suggests is that we should look at combined LTVs (CLTVs), combining
all liens on a property, at the time of purchase. And to gauge how credit constraints a⁄ected
the marginal household, we should look at the right tail of that CLTV distribution. Lee, Mayer,
and Tracy (2011) show that the average LTV at purchase for properties with one lien stayed
rather constant over the boom, if anything it declined a bit. Likewise, the share of purchases with
one mortgage with an LTV greater or equal to 95% also stays constant. By contrast, the share of
purchases with multiple mortgages with a CLTV greater or equal to 95% rises dramatically in every
region. The nationwide increase is from about a 25% share to about a 60% share. At the peak,
about two-thirds of purchase mortgages with a second lien had a CLTV of 95% or more. Keys,
Piskorski, Seru, and Vig (2011), also in this volume, show that the average CLTV on subprime
loans increases from 80% in 1997 to 96% in 2006.
A recent study using detailed data on mortgages in Los Angeles county shows the dramatic
easing of credit constraints over the boom period and subsequent reversal in another way. Figure 10
from Laufer (2011) shows the share of properties in LA country with CLTVs at purchase above 100%
for all loans except non-conventional loans (FHA and VA loans). That share rises from 8% in 2001
to 54% in the fourth quarter of 2006, before collapsing. The sharp drop in this series beginning in
2007 and reaching zero by 2008 re￿ ects a signi￿cant reduction in the maximum LTV ratio permitted
by mortgage originators, since home values (in the denominator) were simultaneously falling.
Third, there is a widespread belief that house price appraisals, done at the time of mortgage
origination, were upward biased during the boom. This would downward bias LTV and CLTV
ratios. As a result, what may look like ￿ at or modestly increasing (average) CLTVs may in fact
be increasing CLTVs once measured relative to the true value of the property.
3.3.2 Other Aspects of Credit Availability
The behavior of CLTV ratios in the boom and bust does not do full justice to several aspects
of the increased availability of mortgage credit. New mortgage products became available to
borrowers that were previously unable to obtain mortgage credit. The share of subprime mortgage
originations (to borrowers with low FICO credit scores) went from less than 10% of originations
in 2002 to 40% of originations by 2006, growing from 120 billion in originations in 2001 to 600
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Figure 10: Fraction of Properties in L.A. County with cummulative LTV ratios ￿ 100%. The ￿gure
plots the cummulative loan to value ratio at the time of purchase for homes in Los Angeles County. Source: Laufer (2011).
billion in 2006 (Inside Mortgage Finance). Likewise, the fraction of mortgages made to households
with debt-to-income ratios above 40% rose from 33% to 50% over the same period (Haughwout,
Tracy, Peach, and Okah (2011)). The Alt-A market, which grew from 60 billion in originations
in 2002 to 400 billion in 2006, predominantly served households with low or no documentation
(asset and income veri￿cation). The fraction of Alt-A loans with full documentation declined from
41% in 2002 to 19% in 2006. Complex mortgages, de￿ned by Amromin, Huang, Sialm, and Zhong
(2011) as mortgages with low initial payments, grew from about 2% of originations in 2002 to
30% of total originations in 2006. Complex mortgages are non-fully amortizing loans, including
the interest-only mortgages studied by Barlevy and Fisher (2011), option ARMs (pick-a-payment
mortgages), negative amortization loans, loans with teaser rates, and loans with balloon payments.
Complex mortgages often went to households with higher than average incomes, living in higher
than average expensive housing markets. In addition to making house purchases available to some
households that would otherwise not have been able to own a home, complex mortgages may also
have allowed other households to buy a larger house than what they otherwise would have been
able to a⁄ord.
Finally, private-label securitization played an important role in providing the funding for all
these new mortgages. Keys, Piskorski, Seru, and Vig (2011) show that fraction of subprime loans
that was securitized increased from about 50% in 2001 to 90% in 2007, before collapsing to 0 in
2008. The fraction of conforming loans that were securitized also increased from 70% to 90% during
28the boom, and has stabilized at that level.
3.3.3 Exogenous Changes in Credit Supply
Moreover, a growing body of empirical evidence directly links measures that identify changes in
credit supply (as opposed to changes in demand) to movements in asset prices.
Adelino, Schoar, and Severino (2011) exploit exogenous variation in the government-controlled
conforming loan limit (CLL) as an instrument for changing credit supply. The CLL determines
the maximum size of a mortgage that can be purchased or securitized by Fannie Mae or Freddie
Mac. Because these loans were widely understood to have the implicit (and since 2008 explicit)
backing of the U.S. government, borrowers in the market for loans that fall below the CLL have
easier access to credit at less costly terms. Changes in the CLL are set annually and depend on
the previous year￿ s limit plus the change in the median national house price. These movements
are clearly exogenous to individual mortgage transactions, local housing markets, and the local
economy. Using data on single-family house purchases in 10 metropolitan statistical areas between
1998 and 2006, Adelino et. al. show that houses that became newly eligible for a conforming loan
just after an increase in the CLL saw signi￿cant price increases relative to similar houses that were
already below the limit before the CLL increase.
Rajan and Ramcharan (2011a) exploit interstate banking restrictions to study the e⁄ect of
credit supply on land prices in the early 20th century U.S. Regulations at the time stipulated that
banks could not lend across state borders. They argue that the number of banks in this era proxied
for credit supply, with more banks indicating higher supply. They show that the number of banks
in a county positively predicts land prices independently of fundamentals likely to move credit
demand for land (commodity prices). They also ￿nd that the number of banks in neighboring
in-state counties a⁄ects land prices more than the number of banks in equidistant counties out-
of-state. Since banks were prohibited from lending across state borders, it is di¢ cult to form a
coherent story for this latter fact that does not involve credit supply.
In a similar spirit, Favara and Imbs (2011) identify movements credit supply in more recent
data (since 1994) by studying bank branching restrictions. Even though interstate banking (i.e.,
cross-state ownership of banks) was made legal after the passage of the Interstate Banking and
Branching E¢ ciency Act of 1994, U.S. states retained the right to erect barriers to interstate
branching. They study branching deregulations since 1994 and show that they signi￿cantly a⁄ect
the supply of mortgage credit. With deregulation, the number and volume of originated mortgage
loans rise, while denial rates fall, echoing evidence in Mian and Su￿(2009), discussed below. This
deregulation has no e⁄ect on a placebo sample, formed of independent mortgage companies that
should not be a⁄ected by the regulatory changes. Deregulation leads to greater supply of mortgage
credit, which they ￿nd leads to signi￿cantly higher house prices.
29Our main measure of credit availability is based on quarterly bank lending surveys for countries
in the Euro area and the U.S. For the U.S., we use the Senior Loan O¢ cer Opinion Survey on Bank
Lending Practices (SLOOS), collected by the Federal Reserve. An important aspect of this survey
is that it asks banks to explicitly distinguish between changes in the supply of credit as distinct
from the demand for credit, on bank loans to businesses and households over the past three months.
Thus in principal, answers to the appropriate questions are able to identify a movement in supply
separately from a movement in demand. We focus on questions related to mortgage credit supply to
households. The detailed information is considered highly reliable because the surveys are carried
out by central banks which are also bank regulators with access to a large amount of information
about a bank￿ s operations, including those re￿ ected in loan applications and balance sheet data.
Data for other countries are from bank lending surveys conducted by national central banks,
and the European Central Bank. The survey questions are modeled after the U.S. Survey of Senior
Loan O¢ cers. (See the Appendix for data sources.) We use these data below in our empirical
analysis.
For the U.S. SLOOS survey, banks indicate easing, tightening, or no change in lending standards
compared to the previous three months. We use the net percentage of banks that have eased their
lending standards on mortgage loans as a measure of credit supply. This is the di⁄erence between
the percentage of banks reporting easing and the percentage of banks reporting tightening, thus a
positive ￿gure indicates a net easing of lending standards, considering all bank respondents.
Figure 11 reports the net percentage of banks easing over time. We denote this variable CSt.
According to this measure, there was a signi￿cant easing of standards from 2002-2006, and a very
sharp tightening afterwards. Notice that this measure does not weight banks by their relative
importance in the mortgage market, nor does it weight the responses by the degree of tightening.
Thus, it is not an indicator of the strength of credit easing or tightening, only of its breadth.
Moreover, until 2007, the survey did not distinguish between prime and subprime mortgages. The
￿gure shows clearly a broad tightening of credit standards beginning in the end of 2006. A cursory
investigation of the ￿gure suggests that the easing of standards in the boom was more modest. One
must be careful in interpreting this series however. There is a long string of observations starting
in 1998 and continuing through 2006 that show a net easing of credit standards. Recall that the
survey asks bank￿ s about how their standards have changed relative to the pervious three months.
Thus a series of observations indicating easier credit conditions relative to previous quarters by a
few important banks in the mortgage space, once cumulated, could indicate a signi￿cant relaxation
of underwriting standards.
We can relate CS to the growth in mortgages outstanding. Before doing so, Figure 12 shows the
share of mortgages outstanding by holder, over time. The line labeled ￿GSE portfolio and pools￿
are Agency and GSE-backed mortgage pools, comprised only by conforming mortgage loans.13 The
13Prior to 2010:Q1, only a small fraction of GSE-mortgage pools were held in portfolio at Fannie Mae and Freddie
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Figure 11: Net Percentage of U.S. Banks Reporting Easier Credit Standards. The ￿gure reports the
percentage of banks that reported easing of credit standards on mortgages, less the percentage that reported tightening os standards.
A positive number indicates that more banks report easing than tightening. A negative number indicates the opposite (more banks
tightening than easing). Until 2006, surveys did not distinguish between prime and subprime mortgages. Beginning in 2007:Q1, the
￿gure shows the net percentage easing for two series: prime mortgages only, and a weighted average of prime and subprime mortgages,
where weights are computed based on the shares of prime and subprime in total mortgages, as described in the appendix. Source: U.S.
Survey of Senior Loan O¢ cers, 1990Q2-2011Q2.
line labeled ￿ABS￿refers to issuers of asset backed securities. Issuers of asset-backed securities are
special purpose vehicles (SPVs) of the non-GSE banking system, entities established by contractual
arrangement to hold assets and to issue debt obligations backed by the assets but moved o⁄ the
balance sheet of the parent company. Note that the mortgages held in ABS were comprised entirely
of non-conforming loans, since the conforming loans were all held in the GSE portfolio and pools.
The ￿gure shows a signi￿cant change in the composition of loans from 2002-2007: a sharp rise in
the share of ABS, which mirrors a sharp fall in the share of GSE loans. This indicates a shift in the
composition of mortgage lending, away from conforming debt and toward non-conforming debt, a
trend that was subsequently reversed after 2007.
The next table shows that the short-term trends in CS are related to these very changes in
Mac; most were held o⁄-balance sheet in Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs). Beginning 2010:Q1, almost all Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac mortgage pools were consolidated on Fannie Mae￿ s and Freddie Mac￿ s balance sheets as a
result of new accounting standards issued by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Statements 166
and 167 Pertaining to Securitizations and Special Purpose Entities. We have consoldated the two into a single series,
labled ￿GSE portfolio and pools.￿
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Figure 12: Mortgage Shares By Holder Over Time. ￿ABS￿are home mortgages by Issuers of asset-backed securities
which are special purpose vehicles￿(SPVs), entities established by contractual arrangement to hold assets and to issue debt obligations
backed by the assets. ￿U.S. Chartered Commercial Banks￿ refers to mortgages held by U.S.-chartered commercial banks. ￿Savings
Institutions￿refers to state-chartered savings banks, federal savings banks, cooperative banks, and savings and loan associations. GSE
portfolio and pools refers to mortgages held as MBS assets in the portfolio of Government Sponsored Enterprises plus mortgages held
in Agency- and GSE backed-Mortgage pools not on GSE balance sheets prior to 2010:Q1. Data are from Federal Reserve, ￿ow of funds,
table L.218. Sample 1990Q1-2011Q2.
the composition of lending over the boom/bust period. We investigate the relation between the
four-quarter moving average value of the SLOOS net percentage indicator CS shown in Figure 11,
and year-over-year growth in mortgage credit outstanding, by holder. The table reports results
from a regression of the latter on the former. The ￿rst column shows the relation over the full
sample 1991:Q1-2010:Q4. This column shows that CS is positively related to growth in ABS and
negatively related to growth in mortgages held in GSE pools. The last row shows the results from
a regression of the ratio of ABS to GSE pools. CS is positively related to growth in this ratio.
Thus the percentage of banks reporting an easing of credit standards is associated with a shift
in the composition of loans, toward non-conforming loans and away from conforming loans. The
subsequent columns show that this result is unique to the boom-bust period 2000-2010. In both
the boom (2000-2006) and bust (2007-2010), CS is positively related to the ratio ABS=GSE, but
it is negatively related to this ratio in the years prior to this boom/bust cycle (1991:Q1-1999:Q4).
32Table 1: Regression of Mortgage Growth by Holder on Credit Standards
Mortgage Holder 1991Q1-2010Q4 2000Q1-2006Q1 2000Q1-2010Q4 1991Q1-1999Q4
All 0.024 0.000 0.033 -0.006
(3.73)￿￿ (0.00) (4.86)￿￿ (-1.41)
[0.24] [-0.04] [0.40] [0.00]
ABS 0.097 0.356 0.125 -0.259
(3.91)￿￿ (2.00) (4.65)￿￿ (-4.69)￿￿
[0.20] [0.24] [0.44] [0.38]
Banks 0.019 -0.022 0.025 0.014
(3.82)￿￿ (-0.26) (4.25)￿￿ (0.92)
[0.10] [-0.03] [0.17] [0.01]
Savings 0.088 0.160 0.101 0.070
(3.50)￿￿ (1.95) (3.72)￿￿ (2.22)￿
[0.39] [0.29] [0.45] [0.19]
GSE -0.013 -0.146 -0.014 -0.036
(-2.37)￿ (-3.30)￿￿ (-2.26)￿ (-3.60)￿￿
[0.11] [0.53] [0.15] [0.25]
ABS/GSE 0.110 0.50 0.140 -0.217
(4.76)￿￿ (2.41)￿ (4.78)￿￿ (-4.68)￿￿
[0.26] [0.34] [0.48] [0.37]
Notes: Regressions of year-to-year growth (from t-4 to t) of Variable on Column 1 on a four-quarter moving average of
CS = (CSt +CSt￿1 +CSt￿2 +CSt￿3)=4 and a constant. CSt has been standardized; a positive value for this variable
means that banks reported eased credit conditions relative to the previous quarter. The row labeled ￿All￿ refers to
regressions of total home mortgages outstanding on the moving average of CSt. ABS refers to home mortgages growth
owned by issuers of Asset Backed Securities. Banks refers to growth in mortgages held by U.S.-chartered commercial
banks. Savings refers to growth in mortgages held by savings institutions. GSE refers to growth in mortgages held as
MBS assets in the portfolio of Government Sponsored Enterprises plus mortgages held in Agency- and GSE backed-
Mortgage pools not in GSE balance sheets prior to 2010:Q1. ABS/GSE refers to the growth in the ratio of ABS to GSE.
Data are from Federal Reserve, ￿ow of funds table L.218.
In the empirical work below, we will focus on the quarterly loan survey data on mortgage credit
standards as a measure of credit supply. In thinking about these data, it is instructive to consider
how they may relate to the notion of credit availability in FLVNa. In that model, a FML involves
both a reduction in transactions costs associated with buying and selling the housing asset, and
a change in collateralized borrowing constraints. Consider the borrowing constraint component,
which takes the form:
￿B
i




t+1 is the amount of bonds household i owns at the beginning of period t + 1, Pt denotes
the relative price of housing in units of the non-housing consumption good (Pt is the time t price of
a unit of housing of ￿xed quality and quantity), and Hi
t+1 is the housing stock owned by household
i and the beginning of period t + 1. A negative value for Bi indicates a borrowing position. This
equation represents the collateral constraint in the model, where 0 ￿ $ ￿ 1. It says that households
may borrow no more than a fraction (1 ￿ $) of the value of housing, implying that they must post
collateral equal to a fraction $ of the value of the house. This constraint can be thought of as a
down-payment constraint for new home purchases, but it also encompasses collateral requirements
for home equity borrowing against existing homes. The constraint gives the maximum combined
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio for ￿rst and second mortgages and home equity withdrawal.
FLVNa asks how a plausibly calibrated change in its value (along with a calibrated change in
housing transactions costs) changes the equilibrium outcome. Thus, one way credit supply can
change is via a change in the fraction (1 ￿ $) of the home￿ s value that must be held as collateral.
But, as discussed above, borrowing capacity will ￿ uctuate endogenously with the collateral value
pH
t Hi
t+1 even if that fraction remains unchanged. This represents an endogenous change in bor-
rowing capacity, driven by economic shocks and accompanied by revisions in expectations about
future economic conditions. These factors get immediately re￿ ected in house prices, which a⁄ects
borrowing capacity and the tightness of constraints. We argue that either of these represent a
change in credit supply in the sense that they are related to a borrower￿ s access to funds via her
credit constraint. Moreover, the two could be correlated (expectations of a decline in economic
activity could lead to an increase in $), as they are in the transition dynamics studied by FLVNa
and displayed in Figure 2 above.14
4 International Evidence on House Price Fluctuations
We have seen above that the U.S. experienced large capital in￿ ows and commensurate current
account de￿cits at the same time that it experienced strong growth in house prices. The same
is true for countries such as Iceland, Ireland, and Spain. In fact, during the boom, there is a
positive cross-country correlation of current account de￿cits with house price growth on the one
hand (Ferrero (2011), Laibson and Mollerstrom (2010), Gete (2010)) and with value added and
the labor share of the construction industry on the other hand (Gete (2010)). Using data that
ends before the bust, Aizenman and Jinjarak (2009) provide a precise estimate of the relationship
between house prices and external imbalances: a one standard deviation increase in lagged current
14The transition dynamics are an exploration of movements between stochastic states with di⁄erent values for $
(as well as the housing transactions costs). An important aspect of the transition is that the exogenous changes
in borrowing capacity are correlated with endogenous changes in borrowing capacity, because the exogenous and
unexpected decline in $ is calibrated to coincide with an economic boom, which bolsters collateral values and
endogenously relaxes borrowing constraints.
34account de￿cits is associated with a 10% appreciation of real estate prices.
Panel A of Table 2 replicates the ￿ avor of these results for the boom period and extends the
sample to a larger set of countries. It reports real house price growth (de￿ ated by CPI), cumulative
current account de￿cits, and cumulative residential investment over the period 2000:Q1 to 2006:Q4,
with the last two variables measured relative to GDP in 2006:Q4. Countries such as Germany,
Switzerland, China, and Austria accumulated large current account surpluses and exhibited slow
house price growth and modest residential investment, while countries such as the U.S., Spain, the
U.K., Portugal, Greece, Estonia, New Zealand, and Australia attracted lots of external capital,
exhibited large rises in house prices, and experienced signi￿cant residential investment booms. In
the boom period, there is a positive cross-country correlation between average house price changes
and average current account de￿cits equal to 23%. There is also a negative cross-country correlation
between residential investment an house price growth: countries with more residential investment
experienced lower house price growth, consistent with the idea that residential investment drives
up the expected housing stock and drives down the expected future growth rate on the dividend
to housing (rent).
It is tempting to conclude that the excess savings of the ￿rst group of countries found its way
to the real estate industry in the second group of countries and fueled the housing boom there.
However, as argued above, general equilibrium considerations suggest that large in￿ ows into safe
assets need not lead to large house price booms because the e⁄ect of lower interest rates is o⁄set by a
rise in risk premia and an expected increase in the housing stock from higher residential investment.
This may help explain why the current account patterns from the boom period persisted in many
countries during the housing bust, while house prices and residential investment patterns obviously
did not. Panel B of Table 2 shows that the cross-country correlation between house price changes
and current account dynamics reverses in the bust sample from 2006:Q4 to 2010:Q4. The cross-
country correlation between the current account de￿cit and house price growth is now ￿38%. By
itself, this negative correlation is certainly not consistent with the notion that capital in￿ ows cause
higher house price growth. Nor is it consistent with the hypothesis that capital in￿ ows lead to a
relaxation of credit standards, which in turn causes higher house price growth. To further explore
these issues, we now turn to a statistical analysis of the relation between house price changes (or
changes in price-rent ratios), measures of capital ￿ ows, credit standards and interest rates.
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Panel A Panel B
2000Q1-2006Q4 2006Q4-2010Q4
real HP gr. CA def. (cum.) Res. Inv. (cum.) real HP gr. CA def. (cum.) Res. Inv. (cum.)
(% change) / GDP2006 /GDP2006 (% change) / GDP2006 /GDP2006
Australia 55% 24% 35% 17% 23% 27%
Austria 1% -8% 29% 20% -17% 19%
Belgium 18% -17% 32% 10% -1% 26%
Canada 46% -10% 35% 10% 6% 30%
Czech Republic 20% 19% 18% 4% 14% 16%
Denmark 64% -16% 32% -20% -15% 22%
Estonia 387% 47% 19% -47% 26% 21%
Finland 37% -35% 39% 8% -15% 28%
France 85% -3% 36% 1% 7% 22%
Germany -16% -17% 38% -3% -29% 23%
Greece 50% 39% 42% -22% 62% 23%
Hungary 40% 39% 25% -27% 15% 14%
Iceland 64% 57% 28% -28% 62% 21%
Ireland 60% 8% 57% -40% 15% 26%
Israel -16% -6% 27% 34% -14% 22%
Italy 35% 7% 29% -2% 12% 21%
Korea 25% -12% 29% -4% -9% 20%
Luxembourg 71% -51% 13% -3% -38% 14%
Netherlands 28% -31% 37% -7% -27% 26%
New Zealand 73% 30% 35% -10% 29% 23%
Norway 46% -73% 21% 9% -68% 16%
Poland -2% 18% 16% 33% 29% 11%
Portugal -6% 51% 42% 2% 51% 18%
Slovenia 46% 8% 11% 1% 18% 10%
Spain 87% 28% 45% -16% 35% 30%
Sweden 61% -35% 17% 15% -36% 15%
Switzerland 12% -75% 28% 13% -40% 15%
United Kingdom 78% 13% 21% -6% 9% 14%
United States 64% 30% 32% -36% 17% 13%
Russia 157% -39% 8% 10% -30% 12%
China -1% -22% 38% -6% -50% 63%
Euro Area 32% 0.04% -3% 2.4%
Corr. CAdef 0.23 1.00 0.22 -0.38 1.00 -0.14
Corr. HP gr. 1.00 0.23 -0.25 1.00 -0.38 -0.09
Notes: House prices are de￿ated by CPI. The data is from di⁄erent national sources (See below), mostly quarterly,
except for Germany (annual), Luxembourg (annual, and until 2009), Italy (semi-annual) and Japan (semi-annual). CPI
is collected by EIU from national sources. For Slovenia series begins in 2003Q1; for Russia in 2001Q1. CA de￿cit data
is from IMF, and SAFE for China. CA balances are accumulated and de￿ated by 2006 GDP (collected by EIU), all
in current US dollars. For Belgium, CA data 2000Q1-2001Q4 is from NBB, via OECD. Residential Investment is from
Eurostat and National sources. Residential investment is accumulated and de￿ated by 2006 GDP, all in current national
currency. For France, Hungary, Poland, Switzerland and Russia, residential investment data are available only through
2009.
364.1 Regression Analysis
In this section we undertake a basic empirical analysis of correlations among house prices and
other variables. We emphasize that, in presenting these next results, we do not make claims about
causality. Later, focusing on the correlation between credit standards and house prices, we will
provide some additional discussion and evidence on this question.
A few words about the data are in order. First, with regard to an international panel of data,
we are limited to far fewer observations given the availability of bank lending survey data for
non-U.S. countries. These data extend only from 2002:Q4 to 2010:Q4. For this reason we also
look separately at regressions for the U.S. alone, where data reaches back much further, starting
in 1990:Q4. Second, as explained in the Appendix, the data on bank lending standards di⁄ers
somewhat by country. When we analyze the U.S. alone, we use the net percentage easing indicator
plotted above. In the other countries the surveys are modeled after the U.S. SLOOS survey, but
the way the survey results are aggregated can di⁄er. For 9 of the 11 countries for which we have
data on credit standards (Austria, Belgium, Euro Area, France, Korea, Portugal, Spain, United
States, Ireland) we have available, or can construct, a di⁄usion index of credit standards or a scale
transformation thereof (some countries report a mean value indicator￿ see the appendix￿ which is a
scale transformation of the di⁄usion index) with the information reported by the Central Banks.
This di⁄usion index, however, is not a scale transformation of the net percentage indicator discussed
above, and there are two (Canada and Netherlands) that only report the net percentage indicator.
For the panel regressions that we report on here, we simply use all these data together in one
regression, even though the credit standards measure for two countries (Canada and Netherlands)
are not a scale transformation of the other countries￿measures. Results available on request show
that the ￿ndings are virtually unchanged if we exclude these two countries. We standardize these
bank lending survey measures, country by country, by subtracting the mean and dividing by the
standard deviation, for the period 2002Q4-2010Q4. This insures that, at least for the 9 countries
for which we have a di⁄usion index or mean value indicator, the credit supply measure for each
country is in the same units. The Appendix provides more details on the credit supply data by
country.
Third, we use a measure of the change in net foreign holdings of U.S. securities as our main
measure of international capital ￿ ows into the U.S. (Although for completeness, we also report
results using the CA de￿cit.) Recall that annual net foreign holdings estimates are compiled
by the BEA in their international investment data, year-end positions.15 Yet all the rest of our
data are quarterly. Instead of limiting ourselves to annual observations, we therefore form a simple
15As discussed above, these BEA year-end holdings data begin in 1976. This is in contrast to the TIC data on
asset holdings which is reported annually only starting in 2002. Thus, the BEA constructs its own estimate of
year-end positions prior to 2002 using as raw inputs the TIC ￿ ows data and the periodic TIC benchmark surveys
of holdings. The BEA year-end data are located at http://www.bea.gov/international/xls/intinv10_t2.xls
37estimate of the quarter-end net foreign liability position of the U.S. in total securities, by employing
a methodology to interpolate between the year-end positions, taking into account the quarterly
transactions data in these same securities.16 The procedure is as follows.
Let nhQ4 be the value of net foreign holdings of total securities observed at the end of quarter
Q4 of a given year, where net foreign holdings are de￿ned as foreign holdings of U.S. securities
minus U.S. holdings of foreign securities. These data are available from the BEA year-end positions
table. Let c nhq be an estimate that we will form of the value of these net foreign holdings at the end
of quarter q in that same year. Let ntq be net transactions in those securities during that quarter,
where net transactions are net foreign purchases (gross foreign purchases less gross foreign sales)
of U.S. owned securities minus U.S. net purchases (gross U.S. purchases less gross U.S. sales) of
foreign owned securities. These data are available from the BEA international transactions table.
To obtain estimates of quarterly holdings for the three quarters within a year, we accumulate
according to
c nhq = c nhq￿1 + ntq + adjq
where










The above recursion ensures that our estimate of the holdings at the end of Q4 of a given year,
c nhQ4, is equal to the recorded value from the annual holdings data, nhQ4. For all other quarters
within a year, the above recursion forms an estimate of holdings at the end of the quarter, which is
equal to the estimated net holdings from last quarter, plus the net transactions in that quarter, plus
an adjustment. The adjustment is equal to the gap between the change in measured holdings from
the year in which the quarter resides and the previous year and the cumulation of all the quarterly
transactions over the year, times a weight, where the weight is given by that quarter￿ s value of net
transactions relative to the value over the entire year. Thus, quarters for which net transactions
were higher in absolute value receive a greater weight in the adjustment. Notice that, in the absence
of any valuation adjustments, the cumulation of all the quarterly transactions over the year would
equal the total change in net foreign holdings or year-end positions. The observed change in year-
end positions takes into account the valuation changes, and gapQ4 is the di⁄erence between the
observed change in year-end positions and the cumulation of the quarterly transactions. Thus,
16The data on international transactions in ￿nancial securities are in the balance of payments dataset, found at
http://www.bea.gov/international/xls/table1.xls.
38roughly speaking, the adjustment adjq captures the pure valuation e⁄ects that are not re￿ ected in
the cumulation of transactions but are re￿ ected in the total change in net foreign holdings. The
weights wq;Q4 give quarters with a larger value of transactions more weight in the adjustment. We
now present results from a regression analysis using these and other data.
We begin with evidence from the panel of 11 countries mentioned above (Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Euro Area, France, Korea, Netherlands Portugal, Spain, United States, Ireland). For these
countries, we have quarterly observations from 2002:Q4 to 2010:Q4 on real house price growth, the
current account de￿cit and credit standards. The variable CS in these regressions is a di⁄usion
index measure that, when increased, indicates an easing of credit standards. A detailed description
of all of these data, including data sources, is given in the Appendix. Table 3 reports the results
of a panel ￿xed-e⁄ects regression of real house price growth on the current account, CS, and
interactions of these variables. The variable CAdef=GDP is the current account de￿cit, divided
by the country￿ s GDP.
Table 3 shows that CAdef=GDP bears a negative relation to contemporaneous real house price
growth, though it is not statistically signi￿cant.17 The credit standard measure CS is statistically
signi￿cant, and an increase in CS leads to an increase in real house price growth (row 2). Row 3
shows that CS remains the only signi￿cant determinant of house price growth when both variables
are included, while rows 4 and 5 document some interaction e⁄ects: countries and time periods in
which there was an increase in credit supply experienced a larger increase in house price growth if
they also ran current account de￿cits. But, controlling for this, CAdef=GDP has a statistically
insigni￿cant marginal e⁄ect on house price growth (row 4), while CS by itself has a strongly
signi￿cant marginal e⁄ect (row 5). The R2 statistics range from 6 to 9 percent whenever CSt
is included in the regression, either by itself or interactively with CAdef=GDP: To interpret the
magnitudes of the coe¢ cients on CS, recall that this variables is standardized, so a one-unit
increase in this measure implies a one standard deviation increase around its mean. The coe¢ cient
is 0.005, which implies that a one-standard deviation increase in CS leads to a 50 basis point
rise in quarterly real house price growth, roughly a 2% rise at an annual rate. This increase
represents about one-quarter of a one-standard deviation change in quarterly U.S. real house price
growth (2.0%).These results provide little support for the hypothesis that capital in￿ ows played
an important role in driving the changes in house prices internationally over the recent boom-bust
period.
17We use the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) consistent covariance-matrix estimates to produce heteroscedasticity
consistent standard errors that are robust to general forms of autocorrelation and cross-sectional (spatial) correlation
between the residuals.
39Table 3: Quarterly Panel Regressions (2002Q4-2010Q4)
11 Countries
Real House price growth on
Regression Cons CAdef=GDP CS (CAdef=GDP)xCS R2
1 0.005 -0.055 0.01
(1.52) (-0.73)
2 0.005 0.005 0.06
(1.69) (3.24)**
3 0.005 -0.018 0.005 0.07
(1.62) (-0.29) (3.26)**
4 0.005 -0.009 0.083 0.05
(1.58) (-0.14) (5.34)**
5 0.005 0.004 0.060 0.09
(1.96) (3.20)** (6.61)**
Notes: Panel data estimation with ￿xed e⁄ects. (CAdef=GDP) is current account de￿cit divided by the country￿ s GDP.
CS is net percentage of banks reporting easing of credit; a positive value indicates more banks eased than tightened credit
conditions with respect to previous quarter. The column labeled Cons gives the coe¢ cient on the regression constant.
Credit conditions have been standardized country by country. Driscoll-Kraay corrected t-statistics in parentheses (lags
max{H-1,3} ). ￿ signi￿cative at 5% :￿￿ signi￿cative at 1%. 11 countries included are Austria, Belgium, Canada, Euro
Area, France, Ireland, Korea, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, U.S. 363 Observations in total.
To investigate a longer time frame, we now turn to an analysis of U.S. time series data. Table
4 presents results from regressions using the same variables as in Table 3, but this time only
for the U.S. The U.S. data are quarterly and span the period 1990:Q2-2010:Q4. Row 1 shows
that CAdef=GDP has virtually no e⁄ect, by itself, on real house price growth. This variable
explains two percent of the quarterly variation in real U.S. house price growth. By contrast,
CS is strongly statistically signi￿cant, and by itself explains 53% of the quarterly variation in
house price growth. When we include both CAdef=GDP and CS in the regression, the current
account has a statistically signi￿cant and positive e⁄ect, and this adds to the regression model￿ s
ability to explain the data: the adjusted R2 rises by 9 percentage points to 62%. This happens
because, over this sample, the CS and CAdef=GDP are negatively correlated. Since credit supply
is so strongly positively related to house price growth, removing its e⁄ects by including it in the
regression along with CAdef=GDP allows the regression to distinguish a modest positive role for
the current account. To interpret the magnitude of the coe¢ cient on CS, recall that we standardize
this variable so a one-unit increase is equal to a one-standard deviation increase. The coe¢ cient
estimate in row 2 implies that a one-standard deviation increase in CS leads to a 0.016 unit (160
40basis point) rise in quarterly U.S. house price growth, roughly a 6.6% increase at an annual rate.
This increase represents about three-quarters of a one-standard deviation change in quarterly U.S.
real house price growth (2.15%).
Rows 4 and 5 of Table 4 show that an increase in CAdef=GDP is associated with a larger
positive change in house price growth in periods during which there was an expansion of credit
supply, or an increase in CS, but row 5 shows that the current account de￿cit does not in￿ uence
the way CS is related to house price growth: the raw series and the interacted variable together
explain the same amount of variation in house price growth as does CS alone. While this evidence
is more supportive of a positive role for capital ￿ ows in a⁄ecting house prices, even here the results
suggest that credit supply is the most quantitatively important variable related to future home
prices.
Table 4: Quarterly Regressions for US (1990Q2-2010Q4)
Real house price growth on
Regression Cons. CAdef/GDP CS (CAdef/GDP)* CS Adj. R2
1 -0.006 0.207 0.02
(-1.35) (0.92)
2 0.001 0.016 0.53
(0.27) (9.94)**
3 -0.011 0.365 0.017 0.62
(-2.68)** (2.54)* (10.32)**
4 -0.008 0.322 0.385 0.61
(-2.33)* (2.31)* (10.74)**
5 0.001 0.007 0.221 0.55
(0.52) (1.26) (0.88)
Notes: See Table 3. The column labeled ￿Cons.￿reports coe¢ cients on the constant in the regression. CAdef is current
account de￿cit, GDP is gross domestic product, both from the U.S. Department of Commerce, BEA. CS is a measure of
credit standards from the SLOOS survey that gives the net percentage of banks that reported easier credit conditions.
A positive value for this variable therefore indicates an easing of credit conditions, while a negative value indicates a
tightening. We standardize the credit standards variable by dividing by the standard deviation and subtracting its mean
based on data for the full sample. Newey and West (1987) corrected t -statistics in parentheses.* signi￿cative at 5%, **
signi￿cative at 1%.
For comparison, Table 5 shows output from the same regressions but over the subsample that
only includes the recent boom-bust period: 2000:Q1 to 2010:Q4. The results with respect to the
relation between CAdef=GDP and house price growth are little changed: even in this subsample
the variable explains none of the variation in the growth of residential real estate prices in a
univariate regression. But the table shows that credit standards explains a much larger fraction of
the variation in house price growth in this sample: CS now explains 66% of the quarterly variation
in house price growth (row 2). The coe¢ cient is also much larger, equal to 0.023 in row 2. Thus a
41one-standard deviation increase in CS in this subsample leads to a 230 basis point rise in quarterly
real house price growth, or about a 9.5% increase an annual rate. This quantitatively large e⁄ect
represents 107% of a one-standard deviation change in quarterly U.S. real house price growth.
Moreover, unlike the results for the full sample, in this subsample covering the boom-bust, the CA
de￿cit adds nothing to our understanding of house price growth volatility, even when included in
the regression along with CS. CAdef=GDP is statistically unrelated to house price growth in all
of the regression speci￿cations over this subperiod. To summarize, to the modest extent that the
current account bears any relation to U.S. house price growth, it does so only in samples prior to
the recent housing boom-bust. There is no relation between these variables in the recent boom-bust
cycle.
Table 5: Quarterly Regressions for US (2000:Q1-2010:Q4)
Real house price growth on
Regression Cons CAdef/GDP CS (CAdef/GDP)* CS Adj. R2
1 -0.018 0.435 0.01
(-0.96) (1.02)
2 0.002 0.023 0.66
(0.43) (11.43)**
3 -0.008 0.214 0.023 0.66
(-0.48) (0.57) (11.89)**
4 -0.008 0.189 0.465 0.62
(-0.40) (0.45) (10.60)**
5 0.002 0.031 -0.162 0.65
(0.46) (1.84) (-0.46)
Notes: See Table 4.
Returning to the full sample, Table 6 shows the same regressions when we replace CAdef=GDP
with our quarterly measure of the change in the net foreign holdings of total securities (the change
in the U.S. net foreign liability position in securities), divided by trend GDP. We denote this
variable ￿NFLt. This variable has no e⁄ect on U.S. house price growth, whether it is included in
the regression by itself or jointly with CSt: Thus, the modest e⁄ect we found from current account
de￿cits on house price growth in the long U.S. sample (row 3 of Table 4) disappears once we replace
the current account de￿cit variable by a better measure of capital in￿ ows. The interaction of this
variable with CSt has a positive e⁄ect (row 4) but only if CS itself is excluded. Row 5 shows that,
once we control for CS itself, the interaction variable has no marginal a⁄ect on house price growth.
Otherwise the quantitative results are similar to those using the CA as a measure of capital ￿ ows.
42Table 6: Quarterly Regressions for US (1990Q2-2010Q4)
Real house price growth on
Regression Cons ￿NFLt CS ￿NFLtxCS Adj. R2
1 0.003 -0.142 0.06
(0.76) (-1.46)
2 0.001 0.016 0.53
(0.27) (9.94)**
3 0.000 0.036 0.016 0.53
(0.06) (0.89) (8.75)**
4 0.001 0.143 0.135 0.25
(0.18) (1.54) (4.94)**
5 0.001 0.016 0.002 0.53
(0.28) (5.99)** (0.15)
Notes: See Table 4. ￿NFLt is change in total net foreign U.S. liabilities in total securities (where quarter-end positions have been
estimated as described in the paper), divided by trend GDP. The trend is measured using a Hodrick and Prescott (1997) ￿lter.
So far we have investigated only contemporaneous correlations between house prices, capital
￿ ows and credit standards. Tables 7 and 8 show results from forecasting regressions of real house
price growth, ￿ln(P) (Table 7) and the growth in the price-rent ratio, ￿ln(P=R) (Table 8) in
period t+H, on variables known at time t. We report results from long-horizon forecasts of these
house price variables on CSt by itself (row 1), on CSt, ￿NFLt and the real 10-year T-bond rate,
r10
t (row 2), and on CSt, ￿NFLt, r10
t , and the growth in real GDP, ￿GDPt (row 4). The ￿rst
column of results reports results from the H = 0 ahead forecasts (contemporaneous correlations),
and the following four columns report results from the 1, 2, 3, and 4 quarter ahead forecasts of
these house price measures.
Table 7 shows that credit standards are strongly signi￿cantly related to the change in the log
of real house prices at all future horizons. Indeed, this variable explains more than 47% of the
one- and two-quarter ahead variation, and 41% of the three- and four-quarter ahead variation. In
general, the other explanatory variables add very little to the explanatory power of the regression,
except at the four-quarter ahead horizon. For example, at H = 0;1; and 2; none of ￿NFLt, r10
t ,
and ￿GDPt are individually signi￿cant, and the adjusted R2 is little changed from the univariate
regression using CSt as the sole predictor variable. The change in U.S. net foreign liabilities ￿NFLt
has a negative e⁄ect on house price growth, one quarter ahead. The real interest rate does have a
statistically signi￿cant negative e⁄ect on house price growth in the three- and four-quarter ahead
regressions; this adds substantially to the R2 only at H = 4. The coe¢ cient on the net foreign
liabilities indicator ￿NFLt is statistically insigni￿cant throughout.
43Table 7: Regressions of ￿ln(Pt+H) on CS, covariates (1991Q4-2010Q4)
U.S. Data
Forecast Horizon H
Row Regressors Contemp. 1 2 3 4
1 CSt 0.015 0.015 0.028 0.041 0.050
(9.63)** (7.00)** (5.46)** (4.76)** (4.09)**
[0.52] [0.47] [0.47] [0.41] [0.41]
2 CSt 0.018 0.016 0.032 0.054 0.071
(6.29)** (4.11)** (3.87)** (4.71)** (4.57)**
￿NFLt 0.036 -0.026 0.018 0.218 0.435
(0.79) (-0.40) (0.12) (1.04) (1.62)
r10
t -0.004 -0.003 -0.009 -0.019 -0.027
(-1.10) (-0.72) (-1.24) (-2.33)* (-2.31)*
[0.53] [0.48] [0.49] [0.53] [0.50]
3 CSt 0.017 0.016 0.033 0.054 0.070
(6.19)** (4.30)** (4.25)** (5.00)** (4.67)**
￿NFLt 0.058 -0.024 0.012 0.216 0.456
(1.10) (-0.36) (0.07) (0.87) (1.37)
r10
t -0.005 -0.003 -0.008 -0.019 -0.028
(-1.23) (-0.63) (-0.99) (-2.00)* (-2.20)*
￿GDPt 0.568 0.036 -0.153 -0.032 0.449
(1.60) (0.09) (-0.19) (-0.03) (0.27)
[0.54] [0.47] [0.48] [0.53] [0.49]
Notes: P is Core Logic National House Price Index. The column labeled ￿contemp.￿ reports coe¢ cients from a regression of
contemporaneous house price growth on variables, i.e., ln(Pt) ￿ ln(Pt￿1) on CSt . For all other columns, results are reported for
forecasting regressions, .e.g., ￿ln(Pt+H) = ln(Pt+H) ￿ ln(Pt) on CSt . CS is net percentage of banks reporting easing of credit;
a positive value indicates more banks eased than tightened credit conditions with respect to previous quarter. Credit conditions have
been standardized. ￿NFL) is change in total net foreign holdings of securities, adjusted as described in the paper, divided by trend
GDP. r10 is real 10-year bond yield: 10-year constant maturity rate in last month of quarter minus 10-year ahead in￿ation forecast:
median response, from Survey of Professional Forecasters. ￿GDP) is real GDP growth. Newey-West corrected t-statistics appear in
parentheses. Adjusted R2 in brackets.
￿
Signi￿cative at 5%. ** Signi￿cative at 1%.
The results in Table 8 for forecasts of the change in the log house-price rent ratio are similar.
One di⁄erence is that CS explains more of the four-quarter ahead variation in this measure than it
did of the four-quarter ahead variation in the change in log real house prices. In this case, even a
year out, CS alone explains 46% of the variation in ￿ln(P=R) and including the predictors ￿NFLt,
r10
t , and ￿GDPt allows the statistical model to explain only an additional 9% of the variation. In
these regressions ￿GDPt helps explain the H = 0 (only) variation in price-rent changes, and the
real 10-year T-bond rate is again signi￿cant at horizons H = 3 and 4.
44Table 8: Regressions of ￿ln(P=R)t+H on CS, covariates (1991Q4-2010Q4)
U.S. Data
Forecast Horizon H
Row Regressors contemp. 1 2 3 4
1 CSt 0.015 0.015 0.043 0.055 0.064
(8.36)** (7.54)** (7.38)** (6.26)** (5.08)**
[0.49] [0.46] [0.52] [0.51] [0.46]
2 CSt 0.017 0.015 0.049 0.070 0.087
(6.08)** (4.02)** (5.46)** (6.15)** (5.49)**
￿NFLt 0.013 -0.075 -0.056 0.097 0.312
(0.29) (-0.99) (-0.31) (0.46) (1.14)
r10
t -0.003 -0.003 -0.017 -0.029 -0.037
(-0.95) (-0.87) (-1.80) (-2.68)** (-2.65)**
[0.50] [0.48] [0.56] [0.58] [0.55]
3 CSt 0.015 0.014 0.047 0.069 0.085
(5.65)** (4.04)** (5.22)** (5.93)** (5.29)**
￿NFLt 0.051 -0.068 -0.010 0.147 0.385
(1.00) (-0.83) (-0.05) (0.56) (1.09)
r10
t -0.006 -0.004 -0.019 -0.032 -0.041
(-1.39) (-0.85) (-1.85) (-2.79)** (-2.90)**
￿GDPt 0.977 0.181 1.088 1.142 1.601
(2.36)* (0.48) (1.25) (0.93) (0.94)
[0.54] [0.48] [0.57] [0.58] [0.55]
Notes: See Table 7. P/R is the Core Logic aggregate house price index divided by rent, where rent is for primary residence,
constructed from the Shelter component of the Consumer Price Index for all urban consumers, SA, last month of each quarter. Data
available from the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Department of Commerce. Price is the Core Logic National House Price
Index (SA, Jan.2000=100). The price-rent ratio has been normalized to equal the level in 1975:Q4 of the quarterly Price-Rent ratio
constructed from the ￿ow of funds housing wealth and National Income and Products data on housing consumption.
The evidence presented above indicates that house price growth is correlated with lags of CSt.
Case and Shiller (1989) have pointed out that house price growth is correlated with its own lags.
Since CSt is strongly contemporaneously correlated with house price growth, and since house price
growth is correlated with its own lags, it stands to reason that the information in CSt for future
house prices may be contained in lagged house price growth. Indeed this is what we ￿nd, as Table
9 shows, suggesting that part of the reason house price growth is correlated with its own lags is
that house price growth is correlated with lags of credit standards, and credit standards matter for
house prices. Panel A of Table 9 shows that the one-quarter lagged value of house price growth
explains 70% of house price growth next period. Panel B of Table 9 shows that a residual from
a regression of house price growth on contemporaneous credit standards CSt only explains 23%
of next period￿ s house price growth. For the four-quarter horizon, the residual only explains 23%
45while the raw series explains 63%. This evidence suggests that the e⁄ects of credit standards on
house prices explain most (but not all) of the serial in quarterly house price growth.
Table 9: Quarterly Long-Horizon Regressions
Panel A
ln(Pt+H) ￿ ln(Pt) on
Forecast Horizon H
Row Regressors 1 2 3 4
1 ￿log(HPt) 0.96 1.58 2.35 2.95
(9.29)￿￿ (6.41)￿￿ (5.85)￿￿ (4.98)￿￿
[0.70] [0.65] [0.69] [0.63]
Panel B
ln(Pt+H) ￿ ln(Pt) on
Forecast Horizon H
Row Regressors 1 2 3 4
1 eCS 0.76 1.33 2.07 2.71
(5.01)￿￿ (4.08)￿￿ (4.59)￿￿ (4.42)￿￿
[0.23] [0.19] [0.22] [0.22]
Notes: See Table 7. Results for US data 1991Q4-2010Q4. lnPt+H is log of real house price index, measured by the Core Logic
index and de￿ated by the CPI. eCS is the residual from a regression of ￿log(HPt) on CSt . CS is credit supply. Positive credit supply
means banks eased credit conditions with respect to previous quarter.
To summarize, the evidence discussed above suggests that bank loan o¢ cers￿accounts of their
willingness to supply more mortgage credit, as distinct from their perceptions of the demand
for credit, are strongly statistically related to house price movements, both in the U.S. and in
international data. By contrast, data on capital ￿ ows, real interest rates, and GDP growth at best
add modestly to explanatory power of these statistical models, and most of the time they are found
to add nothing.
While this evidence strongly suggests that bank credit standards and credit availability matter
for home values, with increases in credit supply associated with higher home prices, there is nothing
in the evidence to suggest that such movements in credit standards are exogenous to the state of
the economy or to expectations about future economic conditions, including the direction of future
home prices. Nor is there any theoretical reason to expect them to be. As in classic ￿nancial
accelerator models, endogenous shifts in collateralized borrowing capacity imply that economic
shocks have a much larger e⁄ect on asset prices than they would in frictionless environments without
collateralized ￿nancing restrictions. Bank loan surveys on credit standards could in principle elicit
information on either or both forms of a borrower￿ s access to funds, and we have no way of knowing
46from the survey questions how much of any given change in standards is represented by one or the
other. In our view, either of these represents a movement in credit availability, and both could be
important for home prices.
Still, don￿ t endogenous movements in credit supply raise a question of causality? If credit
standards move in response to changing economic conditions, which in turn alter expectations of
future home price movements, then how do we rule out the possibility that (current and future)
home prices a⁄ect credit availability rather than the other way around? The answer, we argue, is
that we don￿ t rule this out nor should we seek to, since the direction of causality is not central for
the question of whether credit availability plays a role in driving asset price ￿ uctuations. A natural
benchmark is a complete markets environment, where borrowing constraints and transactions costs
play no role in the equilibrium allocations. Indeed, it￿ s hard to understand why credit standards
would be correlated at all with asset values in such an environment. With incomplete markets,
credit availability can have a large dynamic impact on asset prices even if ￿ uctuations in that
availability are completely endogenous. From this perspective, as long as we have a clean measure
of credit supply, as distinct from credit demand, any correlation of credit supply with asset prices
is of relevance for the question of whether credit supply matters for asset prices.
That said, we do want to distinguish movements in credit supply from movements in credit
demand. The SLOOS survey explicitly asks banks to do so, but their may be some residual
correlation between the two. Moreover, it is of some interest to ask whether, as a factual matter,
the credit supply measure that we study has an exogenous component that still a⁄ects house prices
once we control for expectations about future economic conditions.
Table 10 presents some evidence related to these questions. Instead of using the raw credit
supply CSt series, for these results we ￿rst regress it on the SLOOS survey￿ s measure of credit
demand (the net percentage of banks reporting higher credit demand), and take the residual of
this regression ￿CD;t; as a measure of credit supply. (After obtaining this residual we standardize
it so as to give it the same units the raw measure used previously had.)We also replace current
GDP growth from the regressions above, with the expected GDP growth rate for the year ahead,
￿GDPt!t+4, as measured by the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) median forecast. In
these regressions, we continue to use our measure of capital in￿ ows ￿NFLt and the real 10-year
T-bond rate r10
t as additional explanatory variables. Notice that r10
t is itself a forward looking
variable since it equals the nominal 10-year T-bond rate minus the expected 10-year in￿ ation rate
(also from the SPF, median forecast). Once we include these forecasts of future economic activity
as additional predictor variables, any remaining role for our residual credit supply measure ￿CD;t
in explaining house price movements must be independent of such expectations.
47Table 10: Regressions of ￿ln(Pt+H) on CS, covariates (1991Q4-2010Q4)
U.S. Data
Forecast Horizon H
Row Regressors contemp. 1 2 3 4
1 ￿CD;t 0.015 0.015 0.027 0.038 0.047
(7.20)** (5.50)** (4.39)** (3.94)** (3.54)**
[0.48] [0.43] [0.41] [0.40] [0.35]
2 ￿CD;t 0.018 0.015 0.031 0.052 0.068
(5.28)** (3.50)** (3.22)** (3.67)** (3.58)**
￿NFLt 0.023 -0.038 -0.012 0.164 0.368
(0.51) (-0.55) (-0.08) (0.71) (1.23)
r10
t -0.004 -0.003 -0.009 -0.020 -0.028
(-1.13) (-0.76) (-1.22) (-2.10)* (-2.08)*
[0.50] [0.44] [0.43] [0.46] [0.43]
3 ￿CD;t 0.013 0.012 0.028 0.051 0.070
(2.95)** (2.11)* (2.30)* (3.01)** (3.10)**
￿NFLt 0.017 -0.044 -0.019 0.162 0.372
(0.38) (-0.61) (-0.12) (0.70) (1.24)
r10
t -0.002 -0.002 -0.007 -0.019 -0.028
(-0.51) (-0.36) (-0.95) (-1.99) (-2.11)*
￿GDPt!t+4 0.011 0.008 0.008 0.002 -0.003
(2.32)* (1.33) (0.69) (0.15) (-0.15)
[0.55] [0.46] [0.43] [0.45] [0.42]
Notes: See Table 7. lnPt+H is log of real house price index, measured by the Core Logic index and de￿ated by the CPI. eCD;t is
the residual from regressing CS (net percentage of banks reporting easing of mortgage credit) on a constant and the variable CD (net
percentage of banks reporting higher demand for mortgage credit). The residual has been standardized. ￿NFL is change in total net
foreign holdings of securities, adjusted as described in the paper, divided by trend GDP. r10 is real 10-year bond yield: 10-year constant
maturity rate in last month of quarter minus 10-year ahead in￿ation forecast: median response, from Survey of Professional Forecasters.
￿GDPt!t+4 is median forecasted real GDP growth between periods t and t+4 , from the Survey of Professional Forecasters. Newey-
West corrected t-statistic in parenthesis (lags maxH ￿ 1;4 ). Adjusted R2 in brackets.
*
Signi￿cative at 5%. **Signi￿cative at 1%. 77
quarterly observations.
Table 10 shows that the residual credit supply measure ￿CD;t by itself explains about the same
amount of variation in house price growth as does the raw series CSt, and this is true no matter
what other variables we include as additional regressors. The magnitude of the e⁄ects are almost
identical. The table also shows that expected future GDP growth ￿GDPt!t+4 has signi￿cant
explanatory power for house price growth contemporaneously but does not help predict future
house price growth, consistent with the notion that such expectations are re￿ ected immediately
in asset prices and collateral values. Even so, the residual supply measure ￿CD;t maintains its
marginal explanatory power for even for contemporaneous movements in ￿ln(P). When it comes
48to forecasting future house price changes, only the residual credit supply measure ￿CD;t displays
any clear predictive power: expectations of future GDP growth, real interest rates, and the change
in U.S. net foreign liabilities, all have a statistically negligible e⁄ect of ￿ln(Pt). The change in
U.S. net foreign liabilities ￿NFLt again has a negative (but statistically insigni￿cant) e⁄ect on
house price growth, one and two quarters ahead. Moreover, the forecasting regressions for horizons
ranging from one to four quarters ahead using all four predictor variables explains about the same
amount of variation in future house price growth as does the univariate forecasting regression in
row 1 using the residual credit supply measure alone. The results for changes in the log price-rent
ratio (not reported) are very similar.
To summarize, even when we control for expectations about future economic conditions and
purge the credit standards measure of any residual demand e⁄ects, we still ￿nd that credit supply
has a statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect on house price movements, and is the most important economic
determinant of future house price movements from one to four quarters ahead. In short, a tightening
of credit supply today has an immediate and long-lasting e⁄ect on home prices that cannot be
readily explained by changing expectations of future economic activity or real interest rates.
To form a crude basis for theoretical comparison, we close this section by presenting some
implications from the model in FLVNa for regressions of this type. Recall that FLVNa explored
the transition dynamics of the model over 10 years, as displayed in Figure 2 and described there,
where the transition was calibrated to the boom-bust years from 2000-2010. Here we simply use
the 10 years of data from that period to linearly relate ￿ln(P=R)t or ￿ln(Pt) to the change in
net foreign asset holdings over this period, and to a dummy variable indicating whether or not the
economy is in a FML state. The 10 years of data are also in￿ uenced by the sequence of aggregate
productivity shocks, which are chosen to mimic the business cycle and the relative performance of
the housing and non-housing sectors over this period (see FLVNa for details). We de￿ne ￿NFLt as
the change in foreign holdings of domestic assets divided by the gross interest rate (i.e., multiplied
by bond price) and divided by trend GDP. We de￿ne a FML dummy, CS, to be zero in period 1
(the year 2000), unity in periods 2 to 7 (2000-2006), and zero in periods 8-10 (2007-2010).
We then run ￿regressions￿of ￿ln(Pt=Rt) or ￿ln(Pt) on CS and ￿NFLt using the data from
this transition, and report coe¢ cients, t-statistics and R2 statistics. We use quotations around
the word ￿ regressions￿here because this exercise uses only 10 observations and is best thought of
as a convenient way of summarizing the marginal contributions of credit supply and capital ￿ ows
for explaining house price changes over the period the model was calibrated to explain, rather
than an actual regression analysis. In these regressions, the two reasons that there is a residual at
all (or an R2 that di⁄ers from unity) is that the true relationship between these variables in the
model is nonlinear, and because we have omitted the aggregate productivity shocks as explanatory
variables. Table 11 presents the results.
49Table 11: Regressions Based On Model Simulated Data
Panel A Panel B
￿ln(Pt) on ￿ln(Pt=Rt) on
Regression ￿NFL CS R2 Regression ￿NFL CS R2
1 0.130 0.01 1 0.4177 0.07
(0.291) (0.748)
2 0.063 0.37 2 0.095 0.63
(2.21) (3.62)
3 -0.561 0.0875 0.48 3 -0.505 0.117 0.69
(-6.01) (3.60) (-4.01) (5.73)
Notes: The regression includes a constant even though it is not reported. ￿NFL is change in foreign holdings divided by the gross
interest rate (i.e., multiplied by bond price) and divided by trend GDP. We multiply this number by 100 to express it as a percent.
CS is a FML dummy, zero in period 1, 1 in periods 2 to 7, and zero in periods 8-10. rf is risk-free rate. t-statistics are reported in
parentheses. Data simulated from model of FLVNa, as described in the text.
Not surprisingly, given the transition displayed in Figure 2, the model implies that capital
￿ ows by themselves explain none of the variation in house price changes or price-rent changes.
By contrast, the credit supply measure CS; which is positively related to house price ￿ uctuations,
explains quite a lot (37 percent of house price growth and 63% of the growth in the aggregate
price-rent ratio). When both are included as explanatory variables, the measure of capital in￿ ows
￿NFLt becomes negatively related to house price growth, echoing some of the coe¢ cient estimates
from the analysis of historical data above. In the model this occurs because capital in￿ ows steadily
rise throughout the boom period, when credit supply also rises. Once we control for credit supply,
however (the important factor driving the boom), the regression simply picks up the fact that
capital in￿ ows are negatively correlated with both credit supply and house price growth during the
bust.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have studied the correlations between house price changes and international capital
￿ ows, over the boom-bust period in the housing market from 2000-2010. We have argued that
foreign capital ￿ ows into safe U.S. securities￿ U.S. Treasury and Agency bonds￿ played an important
role in understanding the low interest rates in the last decade and quantitatively account for all
of the upward long-term trend in the U.S. net foreign liability position over this period. Many
countries that saw large housing booms and busts attracted foreign capital, as witnessed by their
50large current account de￿cits. Much of this capital seems to have found its way into residential
investment and mortgage credit extension.
Despite these stylized facts, we have also argued that the same capital in￿ ows that lowered
interest rates and supported mortgage borrowing over this period had only a small impact on
house prices. Although the housing boom was characterized by sharp increases in the rate at
which capital ￿ owed into the U.S., the bust occurred with no clear reversal in the trend toward
healthy capital in￿ ows into U.S. assets considered to be safe stores-of-value and integral to housing
￿nance. While U.S. borrowing from abroad may ultimately have to decline, home values have not
waited to do so, having already given up almost all of their gains during the boom years. This
simple observation is re￿ ected in our statistical analysis of the relationship between home prices,
capital ￿ ows, credit standards, and interest rates, not only in the U.S., but also internationally:
capital ￿ ows have little if any explanatory power for residential real estate ￿ uctuations in samples
that include both the boom and the bust. We have argued that capital in￿ ows need not have
large e⁄ects on real estate prices if they simultaneously push up the housing risk premium and the
expected stock of future housing.
A quantitatively meaningful account of the massive boom and bust in house prices must there-
fore rely on (at least one) additional argument. We argue here that the missing element is the
￿nancial market liberalization in the mortgage space (and its subsequent reversal), which made
it easier and cheaper during the boom period for homeowners to purchase a house or to borrow
against existing home equity. The relaxation of credit constraints, by itself, is a powerful force for
higher house prices. Easier access to mortgage credit increases households￿ability to withstand
income shocks, and it reduces the risk premium households require to invest in risky assets like
houses. In addition, lower transaction costs associated with new or re￿nanced home mortgages
and home equity lines of credit raise the liquidity of houses, and therefore their price.
We have presented evidence that these mechanisms appear to have operated in the U.S., but
also in countries other than the U.S. Using observations on credit standards, capital ￿ ows, interest
rates and house prices, we ￿nd that, of these variables, it is credit standards and credit standards
alone that explains home price ￿ uctuations, with our measure of credit supply explaining 53% of
the quarterly variation in U.S. house price growth over the period 1992-2010, and 66% over the
boom-bust period from 2000 to 2010. By contrast, the other variables combined add less than 5%
to the fraction of quarterly variation in house price changes explained, once we control for credit
standards.
There are several interesting questions for future research. First, the ￿ndings here do not
answer the question of what caused the ￿nancial market liberalization and its sharp reversal in
countries like the U.S., Spain, Ireland, the U.K. and Greece. One possibility is that the international
capital ￿ ows themselves contributed to a relaxation of lending standards during the housing boom.
Unfortunately, this explanation is not consistent, especially in the U.S., with the housing bust
51period, in which credit standards dramatically tightened but capital in￿ ows to U.S. safe securities
remained high on average and real interest rates low. More research is needed on this question.
Second, why is capital ￿ owing from relatively productive economies, like China, Germany, Japan,
Switzerland, etc. to relatively unproductive economies like Spain, the United States, Greece, and
Italy? Moreover, why is capital ￿ owing into safe assets like U.S. Treasuries? We have argued here
that purchases of U.S. safe assets appear to be driven by reserve currency motives and political
constraints by governmental holders in the source countries, but more research is needed on this
issue as well. Third, why were the capital in￿ ows directed toward housing (and mortgage-related
products whose cash-￿ ows directly depend on house prices), a relatively unproductive investment
technology? We wonder whether a relaxation of mortgage credit standards in some countries
(the U.S., Spain, Ireland) and not in others (Germany, China, Japan) triggered the capital ￿ ow
pattern. The ￿nancial market liberalization in the surplus countries itself may have originated
from regulatory reform and the growth in securitization technology that di⁄erentially a⁄ected
these countries. Finally, we have studied the relationship between net capital ￿ ows and house
prices. Other researchers (notably Obstfeld (2011)), have argued that gross ￿ ows in international
￿nancial assets may lead to ￿nancial market instability. Future work should investigate the link
between gross ￿ ows and prices of all kinds of assets, including real estate, equity, and bond markets.
526 Appendix
This appendix provides details on all the data used in this study, including data sources. The last
section also includes some additional details about the estimation procedures used.
6.1 House Price Data
Data on house prices are de￿ ated by a consumer price index (CPI). The data are from di⁄erent
national sources (See below), mostly quarterly, except for Germany (annual), Luxembourg (annual,
and until 2009), Italy (semi-annual) and Japan (semi-annual). CPI is collected by Economist
Intelligence Unit (EIU) and from national sources. For Slovenia the series begins in 2003Q1; for
Russia in 2001Q1.
6.1.1 United States
For regressions involving the house prices in the U.S., we use the Core Logic National House Price
Index (SA, Jan.2000=100).. This is a repeat-sales price index that is based on the universe of
mortgages (conforming and non-conforming).18 House prices are de￿ ated using consumer price
index (All Urban Consumers, U.S. city average, All items) from the Bureau of Labor and Statistics
http://www.bls.gov/cpi/. The monthly data are averaged over the quarter and rebased at
2005=100, so real house price are in 2005 U.S. dollars. Regressions of growth rates use log changes,
log(HPt) ￿ log(HPt￿1) for contemporaneous changes, and log(HPt+H) ￿ log(HPt) for H horizon
changes.
For regressions using the aggregate price-rent ratio, we construct an index by combining a
measure of rent, for primary residences, constructed from the Shelter component of the Consumer
Price Index for all urban consumers, SA, last month of each quarter, with the Core Logic measure
of house prices. Data for rent are available from the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S.
Department of Commerce. The price-rent ratio has been normalized to equal the value in 1975:Q4
of the quarterly Price-Rent ratio constructed from the ￿ ow of funds housing wealth and National
Income and Products data on housing consumption.
6.1.2 International Data
House prices are de￿ ated using consumer price indices for each country, from national sources. For
the Euro Area we de￿ ate with the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices for the Euro Area 17,
all-items. Data sources for residential real estate are given in Table A1.
18Other indexes are available only for conforming mortgages. For example, the Federal Housing Finance Adminis-
tration (FHFA) measure is based only on conforming mortgages and therefore misses price changes associated with
non-conforming mortgages. Like the Core Logic measure, the Case-Shiller measure is also based on the universe of
mortgages, but it has substantially smaller geographic coverage than the Core Logic measure.
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Table A.1: Data sources for house prices.
Australia Australian Bureau of Statistics. Exist. dwellings(8 CITIES),PER DWEL.,Q-ALL NSA. (1)
Austria Oesterreichische National Bank. All dwellings(VIENNA),PER SQ.M.,Q-ALL NSA. (1)
Belgium EXISTING DWELLINGS, PER DWEL.,Q-ALL NSA. (1)
Canada Teranet- National Bank of Canada. Comp. 6 Cities (monthly, averaged to quarterly using sales pair count).
Czech Republic Czech Statistical O¢ ce. House prices.
Denmark Statistics Denmark. ALL SINGLE-FAMILY HOUSE,PER DWEL,Q-ALL NSA.
Estonia Statistical O¢ ce of Estonia. Av. price per sq.m., 2-rooms and kitchen, Tallinn (1). 2009 onwards, 55-70m2.
Euro Area European Central Bank. Euro area 17 (￿xed composition); New and existing dwellings; Not S.A.
Finland Statistics Finland. EXISTING HOUSES,PER SQ.M,Q-ALL NSA. (1)
France National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies. Existing Dwellings, Q-ALL NSA. (1)
Germany Deutsche Bundesbank, based on data provided by BulwienGesa AG. Existing Dwellings, Y-ALL NSA. (1)
Greece Bank of Greece. ALL DWELL.(URBAN GREECE EX.ATHENS),PER SQ.M, NSA. (1)
Hungary FHB Bank. FHB House Price Index (actual buying and selling transaction data of residential real estate).
Iceland Icelandic Property Registry. ALL DWELLINGS(GR. REYKJAVK),PER SQ.M,M-ALL NSA. (1)
Ireland Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI). ALL DWELLINGS, PER DWELLING., Q-ALL NSA. (1)
Israel The Central Bureau of Statistics. Prices of Dwellings (Until September 2010 - Owner Occupied Dwellings).
Italy Bank of Italy. ALL DWELLINGS, PER SQUARE M., H-ALL NSA. (1)
Korea Kookmin Bank in Korea. ALL DWELLINGS, M-ALL NSA. (1)
Luxembourg Central Bank of Luxembourg. ALL DWELLINGS, Y-ALL NSA. (1)
Netherlands Statistics Netherlands. Existing own homes. Dwellings: all. Price index purchase prices.
New Zealand The Reserve Bank of New Zealand. All dwellings, Q-ALL NSA. QVL. (1)
Norway Statistics Norway. All dwellings, Q-AVG,NSA. (1)
Poland Central Statistics O¢ ce. Price of a square meter of usable ￿oor space of a residential building.
Portugal InteligŒncia de ImobiliÆrio. All dwellings, PER SQUARE METER,M-ALL NSA. (1)
Slovenia Statistical O¢ ce of The Republic of Slovenia. Existing Dwellings,Q-ALL NSA. (1)
Spain Bank of Spain. All dwellings, PER SQUARE M., Q-ALL NSA. (1)
Sweden Statistics Sweden. ALL OWNER-OCCUPIED DWELLINGS,PER DWEL.,Q-ALL NSA. (1)
Switzerland Swiss National Bank. ALL 1-FAMILY HOUSES,PER DWELLING,Q-ALL NSA.(1)
United Kingdom O¢ ce for National Statistics. All dwellings (ONS), PER DWEL.,M,Q-ALL NSA.(1)
United States Federal Housing Finance Agency. Family Houses, Q-ALL NSA (all transactions, FHFA).(1)
Russia Federal State Statistics Service. EXISTING DWELLINGS,PER SQUARE M,Q-ALL NSA.(1)
China National Bureau of Statistics of China. Land prices, Resid. and Commercial, Q-ALL NSA. (1)
Notes: Series (1) can be found at the Bank of International Settlements website, http://www.bis.org/statistics/pp.htm.
6.2 Current Account Data
Current Account is measured as the current account de￿cit. Data are available from the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund for all countries except China. For China data are from State Administration
of Foreign Exchange, SAFE. CA balances are accumulated and de￿ ated by 2006 GDP (collected by
Economist Intelligence Unit, EIU), in current US dollars. For Belgium, CA data 2000:Q1-2001:Q4
are from the National Bank of Belgium, provided by the Organization of Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD).
United States: (CAdef=GDP)t is current account de￿cit over nominal GDP, at current market
prices. Balance of current account is from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. International
Transactions Accounts Data, in millions of dollars, not seasonally adjusted. GDP data is from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Economic Accounts, in billions of current dollars, seasonally
adjusted at annual rates; we transform it to quarterly rates dividing by four.
International Data: (CAdef=GDP)t is current account de￿cit over nominal GDP, at current
market prices. Data from International Monetary Fund, in millions of US dollars, and GDP data
are collected by the Economist Intelligence Unit on nominal GDP (USD), quarterly.
546.3 Residential Investment
Residential Investment data are from Eurostat and national sources, as indicated in Table A.2.
Residential investment is accumulated and de￿ ated by 2006 GDP, all in current national currency.
For France, Hungary, Poland, Switzerland and Russia, data is available only until 2009.
Table A.2: Data sources for residential investment.
Australia Australian Bureau of Statistics. Private Gross ￿xed capital formation, Dwellings, Total , $ millions
Austria Eurostat.
Belgium National Bank of Belgium. Gross ￿xed capital formation, dwellings, current prices, millions of Euros.











Ireland Central Statistics O¢ ce Ireland. Gross Dom. Physical Cap. Formation at current prices. Fixed capital, Dwellings.
Israel Central Bureau of Statistics. Gross Domestic Capital Formation. Residential Buildings, current prices.
Italy Eurostat.
Japan Cabinet O¢ ce, Gov. of Japan, Billions of Yen, nominal Private residential investment, not SA.
Korea Bank of Korea, Gross ￿xed capital formation in residential buildings, current prices, Bil. Won.
Luxembourg Eurostat.
Netherlands Eurostat.
New Zealand Statistics New Zealand. Gross Fixed Capital Formation, Residential buildings, current prices, $ Millions.








United States US Bureau of Economic Analysis. Fixed Investment, Residential, Billions of dollars.
Russia Federal State Statistics Service. Investment in ￿xed capital, in residential houses, current prices, billions rubles.
China National Bureau of Statistics China (NBSC). Total Inv. Residential Buildings in the whole country, million yuan.
Notes: Most of the series are from national sources via Eurostat. Gross ￿xed capital formation, in construction work: housing,
millions of national currency, current prices.
6.4 Data on Credit Standards
6.4.1 United States
The variable CSt is a net percentage index that indicates the percentage of banks relaxing credit
standards for mortgage loans (both ￿ considerably￿ and ￿ somewhat￿), with respect to the previ-
ous quarter, minus the percentage of banks tightening credit standards (both ￿ considerably￿ and
￿ somewhat￿). This indicator is taken from the Senior Loan O¢ cer Opinion Survey on Bank
55Lending Practices for the US, published by The Federal Reserve. They report the net percent-
age of banks tightening standards. The negative of this is the net percentage of banks easing
standards, which we use in our empirical work. This is a quarterly survey of approximately
sixty large domestic banks and twenty-four U.S. branches and agencies of foreign banks. Ques-
tions cover changes in the standards and terms of the banks￿lending and the state of business
and household demand for loans. These data are available since May 1990, when the survey
then began including approximately 20 questions designed to measure changes in credit stan-
dards and terms on bank loans and perceived changes in the demand for bank credit. See
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/snloansurvey/. We focus on the question that
asks about residential mortgage loans at each bank. From 1990Q2 (beginning of the Survey) to
2006Q4, the question is about residential mortgage loans in general:
Over the past three months, how have your bank￿ s credit standards for approving
applications from individuals for mortgage loans to purchase homes changed?
The recommendations for answering this question state
...If your bank￿ s credit standards have not changed over the relevant period, please
report them as unchanged even if the standards are either restrictive or accommodative
relative to longer-term norms. If your bank￿ s credit standards have tightened or eased
over the relevant period, please so report them regardless of how they stand relative to
longer-term norms. Also, please report changes in enforcement of existing standards as
changes in standards.
See http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/snloansurvey/ for more details.
From 2007Q1 onwards, the question is asked for each of three categories of residential mortgage
loans: prime residential mortgages, nontraditional residential mortgages, and subprime residential
mortgages. The answer to this question can be one of the following: tightened considerably, tight-
ened somewhat, remained basically unchanged, eased somewhat, eased considerably. Responses are
grouped in ￿ Large Banks￿and ￿ Other Banks￿ . The index, however, is calculated using information
of ￿all respondents￿ . Given that the question is referenced to the past three months, we date the
index with respect to the quarter when changes to lending standards occurred (as opposed to when
the responses are collected, i.e., net percentage reported in July 2011 is the net percentage for
2011Q2). In the report beginning in 2007:Q1, a distinction is made between prime and subprime
mortgages in the survey. In the regressions using U.S. credit supply CS is a weighted average
of prime and subprime mortgages: (net percentage easing on prime)*weight plus (net percentage
easing on subprime)*(1-weight), where weight is 0.75 for 2007 and 0.95 for 2008. After that weight
equals 1, because no bank reported that they originated sub-prime mortgages. The earlier weights
56are based on the paper http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/finance/UBB10-1.pdf,
page 85, Figures 1-3. These numbers are approximately the average share of banks that originated
subprime residential mortgages, according to the Survey (23% for 2007 and 8% for 2008). Results
are not sensitive to using one or the other set of numbers.
We standardize the net percentage indicator by subtracting the mean and dividing by the
standard deviation.
6.4.2 International Data
CSt stands for credit standards for housing loans. Data are from bank lending surveys conducted by
national central banks, and the European Central Bank. The survey questions are modeled after the
U.S. Survey of Senior Loan O¢ cers. Central Banks report the information in di⁄erent ways. Some
Central Banks report net percentages, some report di⁄usion indices, and some report mean values.
Net percentage is the percentage of banks loosening (or tightening) credit standards with respect to
the previous quarter minus the percentage of banks tightening them (or relaxing). Di⁄usion index
is the percentage of banks loosening (or tightening) credit standards ￿considerably￿with respect to
the previous quarter multiplied by 1 plus the percentage of banks loosening (or tightening) credit
standards ￿somewhat￿multiplied by 0:5 minus the percentage of banks tightening (or relaxing)
￿somewhat￿times 0:5, minus the percentage of banks tightening (or relaxing) ￿considerably￿times
1. Mean values: each answer receives a value from 1 to 5 (where for 5, the bank reported that relaxed
the credit standards ￿considerably￿ , 3 didn￿ t change them, and 1 is a ￿considerable￿tightening),
and the mean value for each quarter is reported.
Mean values are a scale transformation of the di⁄usion index, but the net percentage indicator is
not. There are 9 countries for which we can construct either the di⁄usion index (Austria, Belgium,
Euro Area, France, Korea, Portugal, Spain, United States) or a mean value (Ireland) with the
information reported by the Central Banks. We have a larger set of 11 countries for which we have
only information on the net percentage (Canada and Netherlands). We standardize these indices,
country by country, by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation, for the period
2002Q4-2010Q4.
A positive value for CSt re￿ ects easing credit conditions with respect to previous quarter, and
units are in terms of standard deviations.
Micro data for each country are not publicly available, but each of the countries above publishes
an indicator (net percentage, mean index, di⁄usion index) that re￿ ects the change in credit condi-
tions in the country. The data sources are summarized in the table below. For Austria, Belgium,
Euro Area, France, Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the survey is based on the Bank Lending
Survey conducted by the European Central Bank (ECB).See http://www.ecb.int/stats/money/
surveys/lend/html/index.en.html. The European Central Bank￿ s website states:
57The survey addresses issues such as credit standards for approving loans as well as
credit terms and conditions applied to enterprizes and households. It also asks for an
assessment of the conditions a⁄ecting credit demand. The survey is addressed to senior
loan o¢ cers of a representative sample of euro area banks and will be conducted four
times a year. The sample group participating in the survey comprises around 90 banks
from all euro area countries and takes into account the characteristics of their respective
national banking structures.
We focus on question 8 from the ECB survey, Item 8.1, Loans for house purchase:
Over the past three months, how have your bank￿ s credit standards as applied to the
approval of loans to households changed?
Respondents can reply one of the following answers: tighten considerably, tighten somewhat,
basically unchanged, ease somewhat, ease considerably.
For Korea and Canada, the raw questions in the survey di⁄er somewhat. The survey for Korea
is from the Korean Survey of Lending Attitudes, which asks about households￿￿housing lending.￿
The di⁄usion index is the sum of the responses of signi￿cant increase plus responses of moderate
increase minus responses of a signi￿cant decrease minus responses of moderate decrease times
0.5, divided by 100. For Canada, the Balance of Opinion survey delivers only a net percentage
indicator based only on overall lending conditions (inclusive of residential mortgages but also of
other forms of credit). The net percentage indicator we use is minus a weighted percentage of
surveyed ￿nancial institutions reporting tightened credit conditions plus the weighted percentage
reporting eased credit conditions.
Finally, when we analyze the intenational data in panel regressions, for the United States, we
construct a di⁄usion index (rather than use the net percentag indicator) from the data reported by
the Senior Loan O¢ cer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices for the US, published by The
Federal Reserve. Data for 2007 onwards is weighted average of prime and sub-prime mortgages,
with the following weights for prime mortgages: 2007, 0.75; 2008, 0.95; 2009 and 2010, 0. See
above.
Data sources for each country are given in Table A.3.
Table A.3: Data sources for credit standards
Austria Oesterreichische Nationalbank. Bank Lending Survey.
Belgium Nationale Bank van Belgie. Bank Lending Survey.
Canada Bank of Canada. Senior Loan O¢ cer Survey. Lending conditions: Balance of Opinion.
Euro Area European Central Bank. Bank Lending Survey.
France Banque de France. Bank Lending Survey.
Ireland Central Bank of Ireland. Bank Lending Survey. Mean.
Korea Bank of Korea, Financial System Review. Survey Bank Lending Practices. Lending attitude.
Netherlands De Nederlandsche Bank. Bank Lending Survey.
Portugal Banco de Portugal. Bank Lending Survey.
Spain Banco de Espana. Bank Lending Survey.
United States Federal Reserve. Senior Loan O¢ cer Opinion Survey.
58Notes: For countries other than Korea and Canada, surveys follow the BLS survey conducted by the European Central Bank. In
that survey, the questions attained for our purpose are Q8.1 and Q13.1, about mortgage credit We construct di⁄usion indeces based on
this question for use in the Panel regressions. For Korea, we use the Lending Attitude di⁄usion index for households￿housing, and for
Canada we use the ￿ Overall Balance of Opinion￿di⁄usion index.
6.5 Estimation Details
6.5.1 U.S. Regressions
For the contemporaneous quarterly regressions we report Newey-West corrected standard errors
(and t-statistics) using 4 lags. For the long horizon quarterly regressions we use lags equal to
maxfHorizon ￿ 1;4g, to take into consideration the use of overlapping data.
6.5.2 Panel Regressions
We use a balanced panel from 2002Q4 to 2010Q4, for 10 countries plus the Euro-Area: Austria,
Belgium, Canada, Euro Area, France, Ireland, Korea, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United States.
The choice of sample period is determined by the availability of a balanced panel for data on credit
standards (European Central Bank conducts the Bank Lending Survey since 2002Q4), and quarterly
house prices (For Italy and Germany we only have annual data on house prices, for Hungary only
semi-annual data on credit conditions, and for Poland we only have data on credit conditions
since 2003Q4). We also use a subsample of 9 countries where we drop Canada and Netherlands
(see information on credit standards, above). The Euro Area consists of 17 countries: Austria,
Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta,
the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain. We construct log changes, log(HPt) ￿
log(HPt￿1) for contemporaneous changes, and log(HPt+H) ￿ log(HPt) for H horizon changes.
For the contemporaneous quarterly regressions, we report the robust standard errors (and t-
statistics) using the Driscoll-Kraay statistic, with lags=3 (default). For the quarterly long horizon
regressions, we use instead number of lags equal to maxfHorizon ￿ 1;3g to take into account the
use of overlapping data. For more on Driscoll-Kraay statistic, see Robust Standard Errors for Panel
Regressions with Cross-Sectional Dependence, by Daniel Hoechle,
http://fmwww.bc.edu/repec/bocode/x/xtscc\_paper.pdf. and Driscoll and Kraay (1998).
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